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COMMENTS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-APPLICATION OF THE JENCKS RULE TO
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES.
In Jencks v. United States,' the United States Supreme Court held
that the defense counsel is entitled to an inspection of reports made by
witnesses for the government who testify at trial without requiring the
defense to lay a preliminary foundation of inconsistency between the wit-
nesses' testimony at trial and their reports. This decision has now been
applied to the proceedings of more than one administrative agency 2 and
adopted in a modified form by another.3 The propriety of such an appli-
cation, however, may be questioned in the light of decisions of the lower
federal courts which hold that the Jencks rule is a rule of criminal
procedure.4
This Comment will discuss the metamorphosis of the Jencks rule in
the federal courts, the decisions involving the application of the rule to
administrative agencies and their effect upon the Administrative Procedure
Act.5
I.
JENCKS V. UNITED STATES.
Since under the rule of the Jencks case a defendant is entitled to a pro-
duction of written reports made by government witnesses who testify against
him, there has been criticism that this rule opens government files to a
fishing expedition by defendant's counsel.6 With this criticism in mind, a
re-examination of the Jencks case will be helpful before a consideration
of its application to federal administrative agencies.
1. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
2. See NLRB v. Adhesive Products Corp., 258 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1958); Com-
munist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 254 F.2d 314 (D.C. Cir. 1958);
United States v. Matles, 154 F. Supp. 574 (E.D.N.Y. 1957); Ra-Rich Mfg. Co.,
121 N.L.R.B. No. 90 (Aug. 28, 1958).
3. Matter of Sun Oil Co., F.T.C. Docket No. 6934 Sept. 15, 1958 (unreported).
4. See United States v. Spangelet, 258 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1958); United States
v. Gandia, 255 F.2d 454 (2d cir. 1958); Riser v. Teets, 253 F.2d 844 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 357 U.S. 944 (1958).
5. 60 STAT. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1952).
6. This is the position of the dissenting opinion in Jencks v. United States by Mr.
Justice Clark, 353 U.S. 657, 680 (1957). See also 2 U.S. Coe CONG. & AD. Ntws
1861, 1862 (1957).
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Two witnesses for the government testified to certain conduct of Jencks
which would tend to prove circumstantially that his non-Communist affi-
davit to the NLRB was false; the majority of the Court, however, did
not require the defense to lay a preliminary foundation of inconsistency
between the testimony of the witnesses and reports made by them to the
FBI in order to justify the production of such reports. The rationale was
that the witnesses' testimony established that their reports were of events
and activities which related to their testimony at trial. 7 Justices Burton
and Harlan, concurring8 in the result of the majority opinion, reasoned
that since the requests of the defense were narrowly confined to certain
reports, it was not essential to show that the testimony of the witnesses
contradicted their reports.
The majority noted the crucial nature of the testimony of the two
witnesses and the value for impeachment purposes of prior statements of
witnesses, and that if the accused were required to first show conflict be-
tween the testimony and the reports, it would amount to a denial of
evidence relevant and material to his defense. According to the majority,
a conflict cannot occur until the witness has testified; and unless he admits
the existence of a conflicting report, the accused cannot know or discover
such a conflict without inspecting the reports. Therefore, a requirement of
showing conflict would be incompatible with standards for the adminis-
tration of criminal justice. Further, the Court found that the defendant,
and not the trial judge, should be entitled to an inspection of such reports
since only the defense counsel is adequately equipped to determine the
effective use of the reports for purposes of discrediting the government's
witnesses. Therefore, justice required no less than a production of such
reports.
Justices Burton and Harlan, however, would not reverse the court
below in the absence of a showing of prejudice caused by the trial judge's
discretion in refusing to order production of the reports. They believed
that the majority, in granting such a request, went beyond the motion
of the petitioner in holding that the government waives any privileges
it might have regarding documents in its hands by placing the author of
such documents on the witness stand in criminal prosecutions. This con-
curring opinion espouses the view that questions of the relevancy of such
written statements in the hands of the government should be determined
by the court while the majority expressly disapproves of the practice
whereby government documents are produced to the trial judge for a de-
termination of the relevancy and materiality thereof without hearing the
accused. Therefore, according to the majority, relevancy and materiality
for purposes of production and inspection are established where the reports
7. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 666 (1957). Furthermore, these re-
ports were not privileged. Id. at 669.
8. Id. at 672.
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are shown to relate to the testimony of witnesses.9 However, the majority
opinion permits the trial judge to determine the admissibility of such
reports, i.e., evidentiary questions of consistency, materiality and relevancy,
after the accused has been given an opportunity to inspect them. 10
II.
VARIATIONS OF THE JENCKS RULE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS.
Although one case" admits that the Jencks rule could be applied to
pre-trial procedure, a majority of cases distinguishes pre-trial rules from
the Jencks case in holding that the touchstone of that case is the issue
of credibility of a witness at the trial.' 2
In United States v. Rosenberg,'3 the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in a per curiam opinion granted a new trial to the defendant when
his motion for an inspection of grand jury testimony of those witnesses
who also testified at the trial was denied. One court has expressly dis-
approved of the Rosenberg case and holds that the Jencks case in no way
changes rules relating to production of grand jury testimony. 14 Others,
however, would distinguish depending upon the purpose for which the
production was sought.' 5 If the statement is sought for purposes of ob-
taining information to be used in the preparation of defendant's case, pro-
duction would not be ordered; but if the material is to be used to impeach
a witness who has testified at trial, the cases seem to indicate that such
a production would be required. 16
The question of whether the Jencks rule amounts to a constitutional
guarantee of due process is answered by two cases: United States v.
Spangelet'7 and Riser v. Teets.'8 These cases hold that the rule does no
more than establish a procedure for the administration of justice in the
federal courts. This, however, does not follow the reasoning of the ma-
jority opinion in Jencks that justice requires such a production.' 9 The
majority of the Court treated its ruling in such a manner that it seems
that it wished to do more than make Jencks a rule of procedure.
9. Id. at 669.
10. Id. at 669.
11. United States v. Malizia, 154 F. Supp. 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
12. United States v. Palermo, 21 F.R.D. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 258 F.2d
397 (2d Cir. 1958); United States v. Benson, 20 F.R.D. 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
The same reasoning was applied in United States v. Grossman, 154 F. Supp. 813(D. N.J. 1957), but an appeal is pending in that case.
13. 245 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1957).
14. United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 159 F. Supp. 860 (S.D.N.Y.
1958) (only inconsistent statements made before the grand jury will be disclosed
to the defendant, and the court will determine whether such inconsistency exists).
15. United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 21 F.R.D. 103 (E.D. Pa. 1957);
United States v. Carr, 21 F.R.D. 7 (S.D. Cal. 1957).
16. Ibid.
17. 258 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1958).
18. 253 F.2d 844 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 944 (1958).
19. See text following note 8 supra.
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United States v. Rosenberg, on a second appeal to the Third Circuit, 20
raised the problem of whether, in a second trial regarding the same issue,
a defendant may request the production of pre-trial statements made by
a witness who is certain to testify in the second trial because of the im-
portance of his testimony in the first trial. Because of the almost certainty
of the testimony, a strong case for the application of the Jencks rule be-
fore trial was presented. However, the court would not order a disclosure
since such materials were to be used for impeachment purposes at the
trial. The second Rosenberg case points out the tendency of the courts to
limit the Jencks rule to statements of witnesses who have testified at the
trial, notwithstanding the strength of the hypothesis that a witness who
has made prior statements to a government agency will so testify.
Another interesting interpretation of the rule was announced where
only part of certain contracts were produced and given to the defendant. 21
This position was justified on the ground that the classified portions of
the contracts had nothing to do with defendant's guilt or innocence, and
only the portions regarding the cost redetermination clauses which were
divulged were relevant. 22 The result seems proper since the Jencks opinion
did not deal with privileged or classified reports.23
Thus, in order that the Jencks rule may be applied, it appears that
the federal courts call for four essentials :24
1. the witness must have been called by the United States;
2. it must be established upon cross-examination of the witness that
a written statement was made by such witness;
3. such statement is in the possession of the United States; and
4. such statement touches events and activities related to the direct
examination of the witness.
20. 257 F.2d 760 (3d Cir. 1958). The United States Supreme Court has granted
certiorari limited to the question as follows:
"Is the rule of this Court in Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657
(1957) . . . a rule of mere procedure, or does it involve a defendant's
constitutional rights? May a clear violation of this rule be harmless
error? May the conceded error of the trial court in withholding from
defense counsel prior statements of principal Government witnesses be
excused because a Circuit Court finds that the defense was not hampered
in cross-examination of those witnesses? Is it proper for a Circuit Court
to determine what use defense counsel might have made of statements
erroneously withheld"? 79 Sup. Ct. 233 (1958).
21. United States v. Woll, 157 F. Supp. 704 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
22. A partial disclosure of the material would not suffice under the Jencks case.
23. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 669 (1957).
24. See Simms v. United States, 248 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1957); United States
v. Grado, 154 F. Supp. 878 (N.D. Mo. 1957); United States v. Anderson, 154 F.
Supp. 374 (E.D. Mo. 1957); United States v. Brockington, 21 F.R.D. 104 (E.D.
Va. 1957); United States v. Palermo, 21 F.R.D. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 258 F.2d
397 (2d Cir. 1958) ; United States v. Carr, 21 F.R.D. 7 (S.D. Cal. 1957). But see
United States v. Hall, 153 F. Supp. 661 (W.D. Ky. 1957) (once a trial date had
been set, the defendant is entitled to a production of statements of the witnesses
who are to be called at trial) ; United States v. Haug, 21 F.R.D. 22 (N.D. Ohio
1957) (noting that there is a tendency to apply the Jencks rule to both civil and
criminal cases).
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Although most of the cases discussed above involve criminal actions
brought by the United States, they nevertheless provide a guide to the
prevailing judicial opinion regarding the Jencks case as well as a founda-
tion for administrative rulings on the application of that case.
III.
JENCKS AND THE LEGISLATURE.
Some lower court decisions 25 applying the Jencks rule have been
criticized, 26 and as a result Congress enacted a statute.27 The act provides,
in substance, that after a witness has testified on direct examination, the
government, on motion by the defendant, must deliver to the defendant
statements made by the witness which relate to the subject matter of his
testimony. If the government claims that a statement contains matter
which does not relate to the testimony, the court shall inspect the report
in camera and excise the unrelated matter before directing delivery to
the defendant.
The statute attempts to balance the position taken by the majority
of the Court in Jencks with the possibility that a statement of a witness
will often contain material which would not aid the cross-examination of
the defense. However, it was recognized that Jencks did not deal with
privileged testimony, 28 and therefore, no provision was made regarding
such testimony in the statute.
The Senate Committee report on the act states the purpose of the
bill:
"The specific intent of the bill is to provide for the production
only of written statements made by a government witness in the pos-
session of the United States which are signed by him or otherwise
adopted or approved by him and any transactions or recordings of
oral statements made by the witness to a federal law officer, relating
to the matter as to which the witness has testified. The committee
rejects, therefore, any interpretation of the Jencks decision which
would provide for the production of entire investigative files, grand
jury testimony or similar materials." 2 (Emphasis added.)
The Third Circuit has stated by way of dictum that the statute seems
to contemplate that the government must particularize any objection that
25. See, e.g., United States v. Rosenberg, 245 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1957) (Jencks
rule applied to order a production of grand jury testimony) ; United States v. Hall,
153 F. Supp. 661 (W.D. Ky. 1957) (a production of statements of witnesses who
would be called at trial was permitted once a trial date had been set).
26. See S. Rim No. 981, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957) reprinted at 2 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. N.ws 1861, 1862 (1957).
27. 71 STAT. 595, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3500 (Supp. 1958).
28. See S. R4P. No. 981, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957) reprinted at 2 U.S. COD4
CONG. & An. Niws 1864 (1957).
29. S. Rsp. No. 981, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957) reprinted at 2 U.S. Conm CONG.
& An. Ntws 1862 (1957).
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it may have, rather than have the court search through whatever docu-
ments the prosecution may tender in an effort to determine what is rele-
vant and what is not.80 If the government does not particularize objec-
tions, the court would see no reason why it should not permit the defense
to inspect whatever the government produces in response to a proper
request.
Thus, the statute modifies the interpretations of the Jencks rule by
the federal courts so as to exclude decisions which apply the rule to pre-
trial proceedings or grand jury records. 81 It also seems fair to say that
the statute places on the government the burden of showing that matter
in the statement is not connected with the subject matter testified to by
the witness. Only in this instance, even under the terms of the statute,
may the statement be inspected by the trial judge for purposes of ma-
teriality and relevancy before disclosure to the defense. The statute re-
qiires a production of the entire statement if it relates to the subject
matter of the testimony of the witness. If the government does not make
a specific objection to a motion for a production under the statute, the
court will not make a preliminary ruling on the materiality and relevancy
of the statement for cross-examination purposes but will order production
of such statements to the defense. Undoubtedly, this will not preclude
the court from ruling upon the relevancy and materiality of such state-
ments when used by the defense for cross-examination purposes.3 2
IV.
JENCKS AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES.
In Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,8 3 the NLRB, upheld the ruling
of the trial examiner denying a motion to produce all documents which
might be relevant and material to the cross-examination of a hearing wit-
ness. The respondent argued that the NLRB regulations which would
bar such a disclosure had been abrogated by the Jencks case and that the
Board, as a matter of policy, should produce the documents. This con-
tention was rejected by the Board on the theory that the case cited by
the respondent applied only to criminal proceedings and did not apply
in those where the Administrative Procedure Act applied. Furthermore,
the opinion added that Jencks should not operate to overturn statutes
which authorized departments and independent agencies to adopt rules
30. United States v. Rosenberg, 257 F.2d 760, 764 (3d Cir. 1958) (dictum).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Rosenberg, 245 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1957) ; United
States v. Hall, 153 F. Supp. 661 (W.D. Ky. 1957). This is the proper construction
of the Jencks rule since the case did not refer to proceedings before trial but to
rules at trial. See text following note 8 supra. The statute also precludes an in-
spection of the personal comments of an FBI agent added subsequently to the report
made by the witness since the statute requires that the statement should be substan-
tially verbatim as made by the witness. United States v. Papworth, 156 F. Supp. 842(N.D. Texas 1957), aff'd, 256 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1958).
32. See text at note 10 supra.
33. 118 N.L.R.B. 1280 (1957).
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which would be reasonably calculated to maintain their records inviolate.
However, the Board recognized that some of the language in the Jencks
opinion, especially if read out of context, might lead to an inference that
the decision extended to NLRB proceedings. In reaching this decision,
the Board was impressed by the position taken by the Department of
Justice in Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd. 34 that
the Jencks rule did not cover cases conducted under the Administrative
Procedure Act, and that argument seems to have exerted a great deal
of influence upon the Board's ruling. 5
The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., case, however, was not disposed
of by a unanimous Board since member Jenkins dissented on the ground
that the denial of the motion amounted to a negation of the spirit and
intent of the Jencks case. He reasoned that apart from whether or not
the Jencks case was controlling under the Administrative Procedure Act,
sound policy considerations dictated that in a proceeding under that act
the government should conform closely to the spirit and intent of the
Jencks decision so that the government's role in the administration of
justice may be above suspicion and reproach. The position taken by
member Jenkins that the Jencks case does apply is now the rule in NLRB
proceedings, as will be seen in the discussion which follows.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in NLRB v. Adhesive
Products Corp.,86 addressed itself to the question of whether a statement,
admittedly used by a witness to refresh his recollection shortly prior to
testifying at an administrative hearing, must be produced upon demand
by defense counsel for purposes of cross-examination. Answering on the
authority of the Jencks case, the court reversed the ruling by the district
court which had declined to order such a production because of a Board
rule which forbade such a disclosure without the consent of the Board.
Since the court found that the statement by the witness was neither con-
fidential nor based upon privilege, it held that there was no sound reason
for the failure to produce such a statement. The court found it was not
relevant that the witnesses in the Jencks case had not refreshed their recol-
lection from a statement. The court further added that the views of the
Supreme Court in that same case provide a basis for its application in
civil proceedings, such as administrative hearings, as well as criminal trials.
In the wake of the NLRB v. Adhesive Products Corp. case, the NLRB
ruled in Ra-Rich Mfg. Co.,8 7 that the Jencks rule applied to the Board's
34. 254 F.2d 314 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
35. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 118 N.L.R.B. 1280, 1283 (1957).
36. 258 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1958).
37. 121 N.L.R.B. No. 90 (Aug. 28, 1958). The employer moved to reopen the
record after the NLRB issued an order finding that the respondent employer com-
mitted certain unfair labor practices including the discharge of employees for union
activities. The employer sought to cross-examine all witnesses after being furnished
copies of their affidavits. The General Counsel did not oppose the motion. In the
proceeding which ensued, after the direct examination of the first witness, the re-
spondent requested the attorney for the General Counsel to make such an affidavit
[VOL. 4
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proceedings and thus overruled its decision in Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co. to the extent that it conflicted with this holding. Therefore, for
purposes of cross-examination, the NLRB affords parties the right to
production of pre-trial statements made by witnesses who have already
testified to matters contained in these statements.
It is interesting to note that the Board took this position in a case
which would have ultimately reached the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit if an appeal had been taken. Whether the Board will follow the
same view in another case which would be appealed in a different circuit
is apparently a moot question, since Ra-Rich Mfg. Co. applies the Jencks
rule to NLRB proceedings without limitation.
The Jencks rule has met with some opposition in those cases in-
volving draft board classification proceedings under the Selective Service
Act.88 In Blalock v. United States,89 a prosecution for a violation of the
Selective Service Act, a conscientious objector demanded FBI reports
(upon which his classification by the draft board was based) on the theory
that a resume of such reports operated as a witness against him. The
court rejected this contention, adding that the Jencks case did not over-
rule the established procedure in selective service cases whereby the de-
fendant is given a resume of FBI reports and an opportunity to be heard.
Therefore, he should not complain that he was not shown the actual in-
vestigative records. Similarly, in Bouziden v. United States,40 a party
who had been classified 1-A objected to receipt of a resume of an in-
vestigation as unfair. The court refused to compel a disclosure of the
original FBI reports as well as personal notes which had been taken by
a hearing officer of the Department of Justice. These notes were not in
the hands of the prosecuting party, as in the Jencks case.
The Jencks rule has been applied, without qualification, in a proceed-
ing to cancel a certificate of naturalization by the Immigration Service. 41
Similarly, in Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd.,42
Subversive Activities Control Board proceedings were held subject to the
rule. There the court reasoned that since the Board operated under the
Administrative Procedure Act, the proceedings of such an agency must
available to him for purposes of cross-examination. The General Counsel refused
to produce such statements. The respondent excepted, inter alia, to the trial examiner's
intermediate report on the ground that the failure to permit respondent to use the
affidavits in cross-examination of the General Counsel's witness violated respondent's
right to due process of law. The NLRB followed the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in NLRB v. Adhesive Products Corp., 258 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1958)
and held that the Jencks case applied to NLRB proceedings and afforded the parties
thereto, upon proper demand, the right to production of pretrial statements for pur-
poses of cross-examination by witnesses who have already testified in the proceedings.38. See Bouziden v. United States, 251 F.2d 728 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 356
U.S. 927 (1958); Blalock v. United States, 247 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1957); United
States v. Manke, 158 F. Supp. 764 (D. Md. 1958).
39. 247 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1957).
40. 251 F2d 728 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 927 (1958).
41. United States v. Matles, 154 F. Supp. 574 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
42. 254 F.2d 314 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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operate in accordance with standards of fair play and concluded that the
production of such reports is fundamental. The Federal Trade Commis-
sion 43 adopted the Jencks rule along with the rule of the Communist Party
case in sustaining a ruling by an examiner who granted respondent's mo-
tion to strike the testimony of a witness where the statement of the witness
was not produced upon respondent's request. The Commission stated:
"... [W]e believe that the aforesaid rule [referring to a com-
mission ruling that the examiner is without authority to require the
release of information and material from the commission's files]
should not be so interpreted as to deprive the examiner of authority
to order in his sound discretion production of a record in the com-
mission's files for cross-examination, where such is a prior statement
of a witness, which statement is identified and known to exist, and
where it is shown to relate to the subject matter of the testimony of
the witness. In this connection, the examiner should prudently ex-
ercise his discretion and should not release any document (or any
part thereof) which is privileged or irrelevant. In particular, the
identity of an applicant or complaining party should be strictly pro-
tected from disclosure. Consequently, a document so produced must
first be inspected by the examiner before it may be turned over to
the respondent, a procedure which the examiner proposed to follow
in this instance."
At first blush, the procedure set forth in the FTC ruling does not
appear to adopt the Jencks rule in toto since it provides for a preliminary
inspection by the examiner rather than defendant's counsel. Requiring
the examiner to refuse to disclose material which is irrelevant appears
to violate the Jencks rule which provides that the mere existence of a
statement by the witness makes it relevant for purposes of inspection by
the defense. 4 4 Therefore, under a strict interpretation of the Jencks rule,
the material should be disclosed to the defense. The position taken by
the FTC is apparently based on a policy to protect the identity of in-
formants and complaining parties. Thus, if such a party has testified, any
statement he has given to the agency will probably not be turned over
to a respondent, unless by chance it contains no identifying information
or unless such material can be excised.
Although the Jencks decision purports to deal with the production
of a document to impeach the credibility of a witness, 45 it has been argued
in Loesch v. FTC46 that the rule widens the scope of cross-examination
before a trial examiner. Although the basis for such an argument is not
43. Matter of Sun Oil Co., Docket No. 6934, FTC, Sept. 15, 1958.
44. See text at note 9 supra.
* 45. See text following note 8 supra.
46. 257 F.2d 882 (4th Cir.), cer't. denied, 79 Sup. Ct. 125 (1958).
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set forth in the opinion, it could be that Jencks sets merely one standard
for the notion of such "cross-examination as may be required for a full
and true disclosure of the facts," as permitted by the Administrative
Procedure Act.47 In other words, since the act provides, in effect, for a
reasonable amount of cross-examination, the Jencks case has enunciated
such a basic concept of justice that its principle should be included within
the concept of reasonable cross-examination. Prior to the Jencks case,
the concept of cross-examination under the Administrative Procedure Act
was a fluid one depending upon the convictions of the trial examiner or
hearing officer; but now with the application of the Jencks case, cross-
examination, although still fluid to some extent, becomes more concrete
and subject to a more objective analysis rather than being governed by
the vague generality of a requirement of a full and true disclosure of the
facts.
V.
CONCLUSION.
The decisions discussed show a tendency in the administrative agencies
to apply the rule of the Jencks case and, therefore, indicate a trend which
will undoubtedly result in the application of the rule to all such proceed-
ings. Nevertheless, there may be certain exceptions viz., proceedings
under the Selective Service Act.48 These exceptions, however, may be
justified by reasoning that such proceedings are sui generis since draft
classification procedures are unique in that they deal with a duty and not
a right.
Whether the trend to adopt the Jencks rule is necessary under the
Administrative Procedure Act is another question. Since the act pro-
vides for such cross-examination as may be required for a full and true
disclosure of the facts, the discretion of the trial examiner or hearing
officer generally will be controlling. Although the courts and agencies
have not expressly indicated why they have applied the Jencks rule to
administrative proceedings, the dissenting opinion in Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co. appears to answer the question by reasoning that the gov-
ernment's role in the administration of justice must be above suspicion
and reproach. If this is the principle involved, then the trial examiner's
notion of cross-examination will necessarily be governed by the Jencks
case and, where a witness who has testified has made a prior statement,
the trial examiner will be required to order a production of such state-
ment lest there be a reversal on appeal. However, since the Administra-
tive Procedure Act enunciates a policy of fair procedure before the
47. 60 STAT. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1006(c) (1952).
48. See text at note 38 supra.
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agencies, the application of the Jencks rule may be seriously questioned.
Furthermore, the Jencks case is a rule of criminal rather than civil pro-
cedure and although some agencies operate in the quasi-criminal area,
strict rules of criminal procedure should not be applied to them.
The statute enacted following the Jencks opinion should have no
effect upon administrative proceedings since it solely applies to criminal
prosecutions. Since the statute operates to limit the application of the
Jencks case, there may be some tendency to apply the statute to adminis-
trative proceedings for that reason. A position similar to that of the
Federal Trade Commission49 could be reached by such a process.
The criticism that the Jencks case would open up entire files to a
fishing expedition by defense counsel is not well founded since the rule
is not that broadly stated. The Jencks case did not deal with secret or
privileged material, and the agencies need not be concerned with the
application of Jencks to such material. In that respect, they can operate
in the same manner as they did prior to Jencks. Furthermore, Jencks
admits the relevancy and materiality of such statements made by a witness
who has testified for purposes of production but nevertheless subjects the
defense to the usual evidentiary rulings on the propriety of such cross-
examination. Lastly, Jencks deals only with the statements of those
witnesses who have testified and not other records.
Therefore, in an administrative hearing, the agency may oppose such
a production if the statement of the witness is in any way privileged,
without being subject to the Jencks rule. However, if a disclosure is
ordered, it will not amount to an admission of the relevancy and ma-
teriality of the statement for all purposes of cross-examination since the
trial examiner undoubtedly will make his usual evidentiary rulings on
the scope of cross-examination of the witness by the defense.
If the Jencks case may be interpreted as providing that the govern-
ment's role in the administration of justice should be above suspicion
and reproach, it subjects all agency proceedings to a procedural standard
higher than fundamental fairness. Following this reasoning agencies would
be compelled to adopt standards which provide that their proceedings
should be subject to a double qualification, viz., not only the fairness im-
posed by the Administrative Procedure Act but the Jencks decision as well.
Notwithstanding the propriety of its application to administrative
agencies, the Jencks rule must be reckoned with and will undoubtedly
result in the production of statements that were heretofore considered
within the absolute control of an agency. The most important result of
this application will be an examination of statements by the defense rather
than the hearing officer for a determination of their use in cross-examina-
tion. If such statements are not disclosed to the defense by the trial
examiner, then the testimony of the witness will undoubtedly be removed
49. See text at note 43 supra.
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from the record and the case disposed of on such a modified record by
the body to which the appeal is taken, rather than the remedy of a new
trial applied, since the former procedure is more expedient.50
Leon A. Mankowski
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE
CORPORATION.
Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech or
of the press .... - First Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.'
The language of the First Amendment is clear and unambiguous. In
the course of time this absolute mandate has received frequent interpre-
tation by the courts. The result of this judicial interpretation is a body of
law concerning free speech which admits of a number of general principles.
Often these principles are found to be difficult to apply in a particular case.
This is due partly to a changing degree of sensitivity which society dis-
plays toward this basic freedom. It is due in part to the endless variety
of situations in which speech occurs-as well as to the endless varieties
of speech which are sought to be protected. This Comment will deal
not with the circumstances in which the speech is sought to be protected,
nor with the type of speech which was made, but rather with who made
it. More particularly, it will deal with the question of whether a corpora-
tion, qua corporation, can itself assert this basic right against state and
federal action. A further question which will be treated, assuming such
a right does exist, is whether there is any basis for distinguishing between
the protection to be afforded the corporation's right to free speech, as
opposed to that of the individual. 2
I.
FREE SPEECH PROTECTION TO THE CORPORATION.
Surprisingly enough the question of whether a corporation, as dis-
tinct from its individual members, can assert this right to freedom of
50. The Jencks case awarded the petitioner a new trial after the court below
refused to produce the statements requested. 353 U.S. 657, 672 (1957).
1. U.S. CONST'. amend. I, § 2.
2. No distinction will be made in this COMMENT between the various types of
corporations, i.e., profit, non-profit, closely held, public, etc. Furthermore the word
"speech" when applied to a corporation will be used figuratively, to refer to all types
of expression by its agents as well as by its written publications.
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speech has seldom been discussed, either in judicial opinions or in legal
articles.8 Other basic constitutional rights have been conceded to the
corporation: the right against unreasonable search and seizure (fourth
amendment) ,4 the right not to be twice put in jeopardy (fifth amend-
ment)," the right not to be deprived of property without due process of
law (fifth and fourteenth amendments),O the right to freedom of the press
(first amendment), 7 and the right to equal protection of the laws (four-
teenth amendment).8 Some rights have been denied to it: the right against
self-incrimination (fifth amendment),9 the privileges and immunities of
the citizens of the United States (fourteenth amendment),1O and the right
not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law (fourteenth
amendment)." Still other rights would not appear to be applicable to the
corporation because of their very nature: the right to vote (Art. I § 2;
fifteenth, sixteenth and nineteenth amendments), the right to freedom of
religion (first amendment) ,12 the right not to be deprived of life without
due process of law (fifth and fourteenth amendments)1s
No doubt, the reason for a lack of judicial pronouncements on this
subject has been due in part to the infrequency with which the issue has
been presented, either because of lack of a proper fact situation or because
corporate counsel rely on more well established constitutional protections.
Very frequently it happens that the corporation will be joined with other
individual members or officers and the courts will fail to mention the
possible issue of whether there is any distinction between the two in re-
3. Thus, a basic text such as Corpus Juris Secundum merely has this to say on
the subject: "Under some provisions, the right of free speech is one guaranteed to
natural persons, only, and does not extend to corporations. 16 C.J.S. Con. Law
§ 213(1) (1956).
4. United States v. Lagow, 66 F. Supp. 738 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 159 F.2d 245(2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 858 (1947).
5. Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956) ; People of Puerto
Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253 (1937).
6. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Kentucky Fin. Corp. v.
Paramount Auto Exchange Corp., 262 U.S. 544 (1923) ; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S.
466 (1898) ; Noble v. Union River Logging R. Co., 147 U.S. 165 (1893).
7. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) ; Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697 (1931).
8. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77 (1938); Louis K.
Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933); Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania,
277 U.S. 389 (1928).
9. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946); Essgee
Co. of China v. United States, 262 U.S. 151 (1923); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43
(1906).
10. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Oriental Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S.
557 (1899); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869).
11. Western Turf Ass'n. v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359 (1907) ; Northwestern Nat'l
Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243 (1906). But see Grosjean v. American Press
Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
12. But see Swan v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, in Boston, 225 F.2d 745,
750, 751 (9th Cir. 1955) (dictum).
13. Although there appear to be no cases in which a corporation has relied
solely on that provision of the fifth and fourteenth amendments which prohibits the
government from denying anyone the right to "life" without due process of law,
probably a better interpretation of these words would be that a corporation is not
intended to be protected by them.
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gard to free speech rights. In still other cases, where the corporation
alone is a party,, the courts will launch immediately into the question of
whether freedom of speech has been infringed-applying traditional stand-
ards of free speech evoked from cases involving only individuals-and
never state expressly that a corporation, qua corporation, has such a right.
As a result of this lack of definite expression, there continue to appear
in both federal and state courts opinions which expressly deny this right
to the corporation.
A.
Authority That a Corporation Does Not Enjoy the Right of
Freedom of Speech.
One might at once ask what justification there is for questioning the
right of a corporation to this first amendment protection, since the Con-
stitution itself, rather than refer to the "individual" or "person" or "citizen,"
seems clear and absolute in denying Congress the right to pass any law
abridging freedom of speech. Therefore, it might be said, the question of
whose right is protected just as the question of what type of speech is
protected, need not arise. A short answer to the latter would be that
although the right to free speech appears to be absolute, there are nu-
merous instances in which the courts have placed limitations upon the
basic freedom. 14 Thus a literal interpretation of the words is unwarranted.
Furthermore, the fact that at least some judges have expressly held that
this right is personal and does not extend to a corporation, is good reason
to examine the issue more closely. 15 Aside from this, there remains the
fact that a corporation is not an individual, (and in regard to certain other
constitutional rights is not treated as an individual) and therefore its
right to first amendment protection should be established by independent
reasoning.
The case most often cited for the proposition that a corporation is
not entitled to the right of free speech, is Hague v. CIO.16 That case in-
volved a suit by a corporation and several individuals who claimed that
under a Jersey City ordinance they were deprived of the right of free
speech and free assembly secured to them by the fourteenth amendment.
Although the right to free speech was thus asserted by the corporation,
the corporation was dismissed as a party plaintiff on the ground that
". .. natural persons, and they alone, are entitled to the privileges and
immunities which § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment secures for 'citizens
14. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (political expression
among government employees restricted) ; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568 (1942) (lewd, profane, libelous, obscene and fighting words not protected);
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (speech advocating overthrow of the
government by force or violence not protected).
15. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 518 (1939) (concurring opinion of Stone and
Reed, JJ.).
16. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
COMMENTS
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 3 [1959], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol4/iss3/3
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
of the United States' ".17 The majority opinion did not discuss the ques-
tion of whether this asserted right to freedom of speech was also protected
by virtue of the due process clause of the same amendment.' Therefore,
the opinion is only authority for the proposition that a corporation does
not have the right to assert freedom of speech against state action by
virtue of the privileges and immunities clause, a fact which is no longer
disputed. 19
However, Mr. Justice Stone in a concurring opinion joined by Justice
Reed, did treat this question further. He concluded:
"Since freedom of speech and freedom of assembly are rights
secured to persons by the due process clause all of the individual
respondents are plainly authorized by § 1 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871 to maintain the present suit in equity to restrain infringe-
ment of their rights. As to the American Civil Liberties Union, which
is a corporation, it cannot be said to be deprived of the civil rights
of freedom of speech and of assembly for the liberty guaranteed by
the due process clause is liberty of natural not artificial persons.
Northern Nat. Life Insurance Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243 ... Western
Turf Assn. v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 363. .... ," 20
The two cases cited by Justice Stone, though not dealing with the
question of freedom of speech at all, held that ". . . the liberty guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment against deprivation without due process
of law is the liberty of natural not artificial, persons."'21 This view was
reiterated in at least one later Supreme Court case22 and has been ad-
vanced by a number of justices in dissenting opinions.23  The effect of
17. Id. at 514.
18. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
19. See cases cited note 10 supra.
20. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 518, 527 (1939) (concurring opinion).
21. Western Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 363 (1907) ; Northwestern
Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906).
22. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). Appellant corpora-
tion was held not to be entitled to assert a denial of liberty without due process of
law when attacking an Oregon statute requiring all children to attend public schools.
Nevertheless, the court managed to protect the corporation's interest by viewing the
act as constituting a deprivation of the corporation's property without due process
of law.
23. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 387 (1918) (Brandeis,
Day, Pitney and Clarke, JJ., dissenting); Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. John-
son, 303 U.S. 77, 83 (1938) (Black J., dissenting) ; Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252, 279 (1941) (Frankfurter, Stone, Roberts, and Byrnes, JJ., dissenting); Wheel-
ing Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 576, 581 (1949) (Douglas and Black, JJ.,
dissenting).
In the Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. case, supra, Justice Black, in one
of his first written opinions, took the position that the word "person" in the fourteenth
amendment was not intended to include corporations and that the Court should over-
rule previous decisions which so interpreted it. In Wheeling Steel Corporation v.
Glander, supra, eleven years later, Justice Black was joined in this position by Justice
Douglas, who said: "We are dealing with a question of vital concern to the people
of the nation. It may be most desirable to give corporations this protection from
the operation of the legislative process. But that question is not for us. It is for
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such a view is to deny to the corporation first amendment protection
against state action.2 4
A number of lower courts have accepted this interpretation of the
fourteenth amendment and denied a corporation the right to assert free-
dom of speech as a defense to state action.2 5 One such case was Oney v.
Oklahoma City,26 involving a suit by the Watchtower Bible and Tract
Society, Inc. and certain individuals. The corporation alleged a violation
of its constitutional right to freedom of speech but the court dismissed
them as plaintiff on the ground that such protection against state action
was afforded only to natural and not artificial persons, citing the Hague
case. Similarly, in International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v.
Seamprufe, Inc., the court dismissed a union as party to the action, stating:
"The court recognizes jurisdiction over the individual plaintiffs,
... but hereby dismisses plaintiff association. . . . An association has
no standing in court to raise the issue of deprivation of freedom of
speech inasmuch as such constitutional guarantee is personal in nature
and can only be urged by individual persons. [Citing the Hague
case] ." 2T
Again, in Hallmark Productions v. Mosley, Judge Gardner, Chief
Judge of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, stated by way of dictum:
"In passing it should perhaps be noted that... [the corporation]
urges that the acts of defendent officers abridge the right of free
the people. If they want corporations treated as humans are treated, if they want
to give corporations this large degree of emancipation from state regulation, they
should say so. The constitution provides a method by which they may do so. We
should not do it for them through the guise of interpretation." But in Bridges v.
California, supra, a decision falling between these two mentioned dissents, it was
Justice Black, concurred in by Justice Douglas, who dismissed a contempt convic-
tion against a corporation and others, on the basis of their right to freedom of speech
and press, secured to them against state action by the fourteenth amendment, despite
Frankfurter's insistence that "corporations cannot claim for themselves the 'liberty'
which the Due Process clause guarantees."
24. An individual's freedom of speech and of the press are incorporated in the
word "liberty" of the fourteenth amendment's provision that no state "shall de-
prive any person of his life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297
U.S. 233 (1936) ; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) ; Stromberg v. California,
283 U.S. 359 (1931); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1926) (concurring
opinion per Brandeis and Holmes, JJ.).
25. Hallmark Productions v. Mosley, 190 F.2d 904, 909 (8th Cir. 1951) (dictum);
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. Clark, 177 F.2d 79 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd
on other grounds, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); International Ladies' Garment Workers
Union v. Seamprufe Inc., 121 F. Supp. 165, 167 (E.D. Okla. 1954) ; Local 309 v.
Gates, 75 F. Supp. 620 (N.D. Ind. 1948). See also People v. Gansley, 191 Mich.
357, 376, 158 N.W. 195, 201 (1916) ; American League of the Friends of the New
Germany of Hudson County v. Eastmead, 116 N.J. Eq. 487, 174 At. 156 (1934).
26. 120 F.2d 861 (10th Cir. 1941). But see Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc'y.
v. Los Angeles County, 181 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1950) (corporation held to to have
standing to invoke jurisdiction of federal court by virtue of the Civil Rights Act,
when suing for alleged violation of its freedom of religion and press under the four-
teenth amendment.)
27. 121 F. Supp. 165, 167 (E.D. Okla. 1954).
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speech guaranteed it by the Constitution because it had the effect
of silencing its representatives who during the course of the showing
of the picture, delivered lectures. The individual delivering the lecture
however is not a party to this suit and the right of free speech guaran-
teed by § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment is a right guaranteed to
natural persons only. . . . [Citing the Hague case]." 28
In addition to federal court holdings, there are at least two state
courts which have ruled that the right to freedom of speech does not be-
long to a corporation under either the federal or state constitution. People
v. Gansley29 involved a state Corrupt Practices Act which prohibited cor-
porations from contributing money to influence certain elections. In an-
swer to the plaintiff-corporation's charge that the act violated its right
to free speech, the court said:
"The corporation is not embraced within the . . . [free speech
provisions] of the State Constitution. That section, in our opinion
relates to natural and not artificial persons, as does also the Fourteenth
Amendment of the federal Constitution in protecting the privileges
and immunities of citizens from being abridged .... [Citing Western
Turf Ass'n v. Greensburg] ." 30
In American League of the Friends of the New Germany of Hudson
County v. Eastmead3' a corporation applied for an injunction to restrain
the local police from interfering with its holding a meeting. The New
Jersey Supreme Court had this to say:
"On the argument complainant relied in large part on Article 1,
§§ 5 and 18 of our Constitution relating to freedom of speech and
of assembly. Complainant, however, is a corporation, and the rights
mentioned run only to natural persons. While the members of the
corporation have a right freely to assembly and to speak their senti-
ments, the corporation itself has no constitutional right to conduct
a meeting or by its agents to speak." 32
The foregoing cases, few in comparison to the total number on this
subject, are not cited for authority under our system of stare decisis.
They have little value as precedent. Many of the statements therein con-
stitute dictum. Most of them appear to have been overruled on the cor-
porate expression aspect by other large bodies of case law. They are
28. 190 F.2d 904, 909 (8th Cir. 1951).
29. 191 Mich. 357, 158 N.W. 195 (1916).
30. Id. at 376, 377, 158 N.W. at 201.
31. 116 N.J. Eq. 487, 174 At. 156 (1934). But see Adams Newark Theatre
Co. v. City of Newark, 39 N.J. Super, 111, 120 A.2d 496 (1934) (city ordinance
held unconstitutional as a violation of the corporation's right to freedom of speech).
32. American League of the Friends of the New Germany of Hydson County
v. Eastmead, 116 N.J. Eq. 487, 174 Atl. 156 (1934).
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important, however, in that they testify to a degree of doubt as to this
important constitutional question. Most of that doubt stems not from any
analysis of the first amendment itself but from disagreement as to the
interpretation of the "liberty" provision in the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, 3 which interpretation is an essential link in the
ultimate protection of first amendment rights against state action. 34 The
following body of cases is contrary to both this narrow view of whose
liberty is protected by the fourteenth amendment as well as to the in-
ference that corporations are without free speech protection.
B.
Authority That a Corporation Is Entitled to Free Speech.
(1) Press, Theatre and Movie Cases.
There are a number of comparatively recent cases involving news-
paper corporations, theatre corporations and film distributing corporations
which furnish the strongest authority for recognition of the right of a
corporation to freedom of speech as well as freedom of the press.3 5 These
cases are important for two reasons. First, because although freedom
of the press is a separate and distinct right under the first amendment,
there is a great deal of similarity between freedom of press and freedom
of speech. 36 The press is one important mode of expression. To grant
a corporation the right to express itself in print and yet deny it the right
to express itself through agents and other paid spokesmen seems incon-
sistent and a totally unfounded distinction. It is, of course, arguable that
there is a basis for some distinction in the type of control to be exercised
over these two freedoms.' 7 But to deny a corporation the right of oral
33. See generally, Warren, The New Liberty Under The Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 39 HARV. L. Rzv. 431 (1926).
34. Every case cited in note 25 as denying first amendment protection to a cor-
poration or other organization involved alleged violation of these rights by state
action. Except for two cases in state courts (which were based on the state as well
as the federal constitution), the cases denied this free-speech protection as a con-
sequence of their narrow interpretation of the fourteenth amendment. Thus, every
one of these cases cited either Hague v. C.I.O., Western Turf Ass'n. v. Greenberg, or
Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs.
35. Superior Films, Inc. v. Dept. of Education, 346 U.S. 587 (1954); Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) ; Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947) ;
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252
(1941) ; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) ; Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697 (1931).
36. This is evident from the frequency with which the Court speaks of these
two freedoms in the one phrase "freedom of speech and of the press." Perhaps these
freedoms were quite distinct in early constitutional history, but today, the Court
seldom distinguishes between the two. Thus, in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343
U.S. 495 (1952), the Court granted a motion picture corporation protection under
the guarantee of freedom of speech as well as freedom of the press, making no attempt
to clearly define which of these freedoms was more appropriate to the motion picture
industry.
37. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952), a case involv-
ing the right of the plaintiff to exhibit a particular film. The Court, in referring to
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expression by agents and yet grant it the right to make that very same
expression in writing, appears anomalous.38
Secondly, these cases are significant in that they interpret the liberty
provision contained in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
so as to include the corporation within its protection. 9 If such a position
is accepted, it abrogates the only two cases upon which Justice Stone
relied in his concurring opinion in the Hague case.40 Thus, what little
authority there is for denying the corporation freedom of speech appears
to be inconsistent with this established body of case law.
The most important case in this area is Grosjean v. American Press
Co.,41 involving a suit by a number of corporate publishing companies to
contest the constitutionality of a Louisiana State licensing tax on printed
adds. The argument was made by the State that, since the defendants
were corporations, their first amendment right to free press was not pro-
tected by the fourteenth amendment due process clause. In answer, a
unanimous Court stated:
"Appellant contends that the Fourteenth Amendment does not
apply to corporations; but this is only partly true. A corporation
we have held, is not a 'citizen' within the meaning of the privileges
and immunities clause. Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall, 168, 19 L. Ed.
357. But a corporation is a 'person' within the meaning of the equal
and due process of law clauses, which are clauses involved here.
Covington & L. Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578 .
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 . . ." 42
Further support for this broad view of fourteenth amendment pro-
tection, and as a corollary to the free press cases, falling somewhere be-
the various media of communication, stated: ". . . Nor does it follow that motion
pictures are necessarily subject to the precise rules governing any other particular
method of expression. Each method tends to present its own peculiar problems. But
the basic principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment's
command, do not vary. Those principles, as they have frequently been enunciated
by the Court, make freedom of expression the rule."
38. It could be argued that a newspaper or publishing company's right to freedom
of the press should be protected as a property right. See Note, 48 HARV. L. Rxv. 507
(1935) and note 22 supra.
39. Each of these press cases involved a corporation, and the protection afforded
to the press against state action rested on the fourteenth amendment. See Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
40. Of course, it could be argued that these cases merely carved out an excep-
tion to the rule that the liberty of the fourteenth amendment, referred to liberty of
natural persons only. The Hague case was decided after Grosjean v. American Press
and made no attempt to distinguish it. As a practical matter the press today is a
corporately controlled media. Moreover, the right to a free press may be viewed as
somewhat public in nature, rather than resting solely on the individual. Recognizing
this, the Court may have felt less constrained in limiting who might sue, lest this
public right go unprotected.
41. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
42. Id. at 244. The cases which the Court relied upon to sustain this proposition
all involved the deprivation of property without due process and the Court made no
attempt to distinguish those cases holding a contrary rule as regards liberty. See
note 21 supra.
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tween traditional free speech and free press, are the cases involving moving
pictures or live stage shows. The first such case in which the Supreme
Court recognized this media of communication as being protected under
freedom of speech and freedom of the press as incorporated into the four-
teenth amendment, was Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,43 in which the
appellant, a corporation engaged in the business of distributing motion
pictures, was refused a license authorizing exhibition of the movie The
Miracle on the ground that it was "sacrilegious" and thus violated a New
York licensing statute. A unanimous Court concluded that motion pic-
tures do fall within ". . . the free speech and free press provisions of the
First and Fourteenth Amendment." They accordingly struck down the
statute as violating the corporation's rights.
It would serve no purpose to review the numerous other cases in-
volving freedom of the press. The great majority of them deal with
corporations. Many of them speak in terms of "freedom of speech and
freedom of the press." They are strong authority for granting both of
these first amendment rights to the corporation.
(2) The Blacklisting Acts or Service Letter Cases.
During the early nineteen hundreds, a number of states passed so-called
Service Letter Acts requiring any corporation that discharged an em-
ployee for any reason, to issue to that employee, upon request, a written
letter stating why the employee had left.44 Failure to supply such a letter
was made a misdemeanor. These statutes were frequently attacked on
constitutional grounds; in at least three such cases the highest court of
a state held the act unconstitutional on the grounds that it infringed upon
the corporation's rights to remain silent, a correlative right to freedom
of speech. 45 Thus, in Wallace v. Georgia C. & N. Ry. Co. the court stated:
"A statute which undertakes to make it the duty of ... [certain
corporations] to engage in correspondence of this sort with their
discharged agents and employes . . . is violative of the general private
right of silence enjoyed in this state by all persons, natural or artificial,
from time immemorial and is utterly void and of no effect. Liberty
of speech and of writing is secured by the Constitution and incident
thereto is the correlative liberty of silence, no less important nor
less sacred." 46 (Emphasis added.)
43. 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952).
44. E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 5206r (Homer 1901); MONT. Rev. CoDes ANN.§§ 1755-1757 (1907) ; NAB. REv. STAT. §§ 3572-3574 (1913) ; OKLA. Rev. LAWS
§ 3769 (1910); Tzx. Rev. Civ. STAT. art. 594 (1911).
45. Wallace v. Georgia C. & N. Ry. Co., 94 Ga. 732, 22 S.W. 579 (1894);
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Brown, 80 Kan. 312, 102 Pac. 459 (1909) ; St. Louis
Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Griffin, 106 Tex. 477, 171 S.W. 703 (1914).
46. 94 Ga. 732, 22 S.E. 579 (1894).
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Moreover, even in those cases which rejected this argument against
the acts, the courts did not rule that the corporation had no right to this
fundamental freedom. Rather, they balanced such a right against rights
of an employee, and concluded that the act was a reasonable restriction
on the corporation's right.47 Thus these cases are among the earliest
authority for extending free speech protection to a corporation.
(3) National Labor Relations Act Cases.
Since the passage of the original National Labor Relations Act4 8
(making it an unfair labor practice for any employer "to interfere with,
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
section 7 ... [referring to the right to organize and join labor unions]"), 49
there have occurred a great number of federal cases involving the issue
of whether particular utterances by an employer are in fact unfair labor
practices. Very often in defense to such a charge the employer alleges
that the particular action involved is constitutionally protected speech.
Were the court to deny to a corporation any such constitutional protec-
tion, the great majority of these cases would be easily settled since most
of them do involve corporations. Actually' the case law has produced an
opposite result. The courts, including the Supreme Court, view these
cases as involving a delicate balance of constitutionally protected rights,
i.e., the employer's right to free speech and the employer's right to
organize.50
In the first case involving this issue to reach the Supreme Court,
NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., the corporate defendant urged that
the National Labor Relations Board's finding of an unfair labor practice
was repugnant to the first amendment. In reply to this the Court said
that "neither the Act nor the Board's order here enjoins the [corporate]
employer from expressing its views on labor policies or problems, nor
is a penalty imposed upon it because of any utterance which it has made." 51
The Court ruled that a corporate employer has a constitutional right
to express his opinion on unionization, so long as the expression does not
tend to intimidate the employee ;52 and in speaking of an employer's con-
stitutional right, the Court made no attempt to distinguish corporate
and non-corporate employers. This case and the many which followed
its reasoning appear to be compelling authority for the proposition that a
47. Cheek v. Prudential Ins. Co., 192 S.W. 387 (Mo. 1917), rev'd on other grounds,
289 U.S. 530 (1922) ; Dickinson v. Perry, 75 Okla. 25, 181 Pac. 504 (1919).
48. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1952).
49. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1952).
50. See Annot. 146 A.L.R. 1024 (1943) for further cases recognizing the right
of an employer to freedom of speech.
51. 314 U.S. 469, 477 (1941).
52. The case was accordingly remanded. The Board subsequently found that the
speech, not alone, but in context with other coercive conduct amounted to an unfair
labor practice, and this finding was upheld, 132 F.2d 390 (4th Cir. 1942), aff'd, 319
U.S. 533 (1943).
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corporation is recognized by the Supreme Court as having the right to
free speech.
A great number of courts of appeals cases are based on the assump-
tion that such a right does exist.53 Thus, in NLRB v. Montgomery Ward
& Co. the court reversed a Board order on the ground that it violated the
corporation's right to free speech, stating:
"It is argued that compulsory attendance at the meeting was a
species of coercion. . . . One need not, as a condition precedent to
his right to free speech under the First Amendment, secure per-
mission of his auditor .... In asking its employees to attend a meeting
on company time, at which affairs of mutual interest to respondent
and the employees were to be discussed, respondent [corporation]
was employing a convenient means of communicating with its em-
ployees. The employees were paid for attending and were not in-
convenienced in the least. If they were influenced against their will
by the arguments presented, this was a legitimate consequence of
free speech and presumably one of its purposes. Free speech is not
limited to ineffective speech." 54
In NLRB v. Ford Motor Co.55 the court pointed out the importance
of the first amendment right to free speech and held that the dissemination
of information concerning labor disputes is within the area of free dis-
cussion guaranteed by the first amendment. Furthermore, this right is
enjoyed by the employer as well as the employee. It concluded that the
Ford Motor Company's basic constitutional rights were infringed by the
Board order, and accordingly set it aside.
There are a great many of these cases under the National Labor
Relations Act. 56 Generally they involve a corporation as the sole party
plaintiff. Unfortunately, the courts never bother to expressly dispel any
doubts as to the specific right of a corporation (as distinguished from an
individual) to so attack a board finding. Probably this is because they
themselves entertain no doubts in this matter. Even Justice Stone, who
wrote the earlier noted concurring opinion in the Hague case, assented
to this right. 7 To deny to a corporation, qua corporation, the right to
free speech, would be to necessarily overrule all of these cases.
53. See NLRB v. American Tube Bending Co., 134 F.2d 993, (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 320 U.S. 768 (1943) ; NLRB v. Ford Motor Co., 114 F.2d 905, (6th Cir. 1940),
cert. denied, 312 U.S. 689 (1941). See also note 50 supra.
54. 157 F.2d 486, 498-99 (8th Cir. 1946).
55. 114 F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1940).
56. For an analysis of some of these cases and the free speech problems which they
present, see Van Dusen, Freedom of Speech and the National Labor Relations Act,
35 ILL. L. R4v. 409 (1940) ; Comment, Employer Freedom of Speech in Labor Rela-
tions, 14 FORD. L. Rev. 59 (1945).
57. Justice Stone joined with the majority in the Virginia Power and Elec. Co.
case, 314 U.S. 469 (1941).
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(4) Corrupt Practices Act Cases.
The Federal Corrupt Practices Act 8 contains a provision which
makes it unlawful "for . . .any corporation . . .or labor organization ...
to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with . . . [certain
federal elections]." 59 This act has been interpreted to deny to the cor-
poration any right to attempt to influence the outcome of certain federal
elections. Included in such a prohibition would of course be corporate
sponsored political speech. Though the act has little judicial history (due
to the federal government's failure vigorously to enforce it), what case
law it has produced seems to support the right of a corporation to freedom
of speech.
Thus, in United States v. United States Brewers' Ass'ni 0 the only
reported case under the Corrupt Practices Act involving a corporation,6 '
the court rejected a plea by the defendant that the act violated its right
to freedom of speech and freedom of the press under the first amendment.
Rather than deny the existence of such a right, however, the court simply
concluded that these freedoms were not infringed.
All of the later cases involving the Federal Corrupt Practices Act
were suits against labor unions rather than corporations. The first of
these to reach the Supreme Court, United States v. CIOf,2 involved alleged
expenditures by the defendant union to influence the outcome of a certain
federal election. The Court dismissed the indictment on the ground that
it failed to state an offense under the act. The language of the opinion
indicates doubt as to the constitutionality of the act and at least infer-
entially supports the proposition that a corporation does have the right
to freedom of expression. More explicit on this matter, however, is the
dissenting opinion of four justices.6 3 They felt that the indictment did
state an offense but that the act was unconstitutional on its face as vio-
lating a union's right to freedom of speech. Quoting from the dissent:
"The argument for applying and sustaining ... [the act] in its
presently attempted application has gone largely upon the assumption
that it would be valid as applied to similar corporate publications,
excepting possibly the corporate press. The assumption is one not
justified by any decision of this Court, which has the final voice
in such matters. There are of course important legal and economic
differences remaining between corporations and unincorporated asso-
ciations, including labor unions, which justify large distinctions be-
58. Act of Feb. 28, 1925, c. 368, §§ 301-319, 43 Stat. 1053, as amended (codified in
scattered sections of Titles 2, 18 U.S.C.).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1952).
60. 239 Fed. 163 (W.D. Pa. 1916).
61. But see Egan v. United States, 137 F.2d 369 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 320 U.S.
788 (1943) (ban on political contributions by registered public utility holding com-
panies held constitutional).
62. 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
63. Rutledge, Black, Douglas, and Murphy, JJ.
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tween them in legal treatment. But to what extent this may be true,
it does not follow that the broadside and blanketing prohibitions here
attempted in restriction of freedom of expression and assembly would
be valid in their corporate applications. Corporations have been held
within the First Amendment protection against restrictions upon the
circulation of their media of expression. Grosjean v. American Press
Co., 297 U.S. 233. . . . It cannot therefore be taken merely upon
legislative assumption, practice or judgment that restrictions upon
freedom of expression by corporations are valid." 4 (Emphasis added.)
Of course the significance of this statement is lessened by the fact
that it was only a dissent. Furthermore the Grosjean case actually in-
volved freedom of the regular press and there may be a basis for distin-
guishing between restrictions on the corporate press as opposed to restric-
tions on other types of corporations.6 5 Nevertheless, these four justices
seemed quite explicit in recognizing a corporation's right to freedom of
expression.
The second case, which also involved a labor union, was United States
v. International Union, UAW.66 Again the majority managed to avoid
passing on the constitutionality of the act, although three justices, in dis-
sent, held the act unconstitutional, saying:
"Some may think that one group or another should not express
its views in an election because it is too powerful, because it advo-
cates unpopular ideas or because it has a record of lawless action.
But these are not justification for withholding First Amendment
rights from any group-labor or corporate. . . . First Amendment
rights are part of the heritage of all persons and groups in this country.
They are not to be dispensed or withheld merely because we or the
Congress the person or group is worthy or unworthy." 67 (Emphasis
added.)
These cases indicate that this act may be held unconstitutional because
of its sweeping restrictions on labor union expression.6 8 Such a conclusion
is equally valid with respect to corporate expression, as is indicated by
the dissents in the labor cases. If in an appropriate case, the Supreme
Court were to reach this latter conclusion it would necessarily have to
recognize the right of a corporation to freedom of speech, since the act
is specifically directed at corporate activity and leaves the individual free
to express his views on any political matter. Even if the Court were to
64. United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 154 (1948) (dissent).
65. See note 40, supra.
66. 352 U.S. 567 (1957).
67. Id. at 597. Warren C.J., Black, and Douglas, JJ.
68. For two interesting studies of the act, see Garrett, Corporate Contributions
For Political Purposes, 14 Bus. LAw 365 (1959) ; Lane, Analysis of The Federal Law
Governing Political Expenditures By Labor Unions, 9 LAB. L. J. 875 (1958).
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reject such an attack, it might expressly treat this issue and proceed to
balance such a right against the right of Congress to protect the free
electorate system. This would affirm the existence of such a right in cases
involving other than a newspaper or theatre corporation.6 9
In addition to the categories of cases discussed above, there are many
other instances in which the courts have expressly, or by clear implica-
tion, conceded the right of a corporation or labor union (as distinguished
from its members) to assert freedom of speech as a defense to govern-
ment action. 70  In some of these the corporation or union was the sole
party asserting this right. In others, it was joined with its members. In
none of these did the court dismiss the organization simply on the basis
of lack of standing to assert such a fundamental right.
Furthermore, there is a logical inconsistency in denying corporations
the right to freedom of expression. An organization can "speak" only
through its agents. When these agents speak, they do so representatively
and thus must ". . . assume the rights, duties and privileges of the cor-
poration.171 Therefore, if a corporation is not entitled to freedom of
speech, its agents acting in a purely official capacity cannot claim these
rights. But the Court has refused to deny the right to freedom of speech
to such persons simply because they spoke as agents of another.
72
Finally, the Constitution itself protects more than the individual's
speech-it protects group speech by virtue of the cognate right to freedom
of assembly also found in the first amendment. 73 When the draftsmen
of the Constitution inserted the right to freedom of assembly into that
writing, they were merely recognizing the need for effective speech. But
today, effective speech means much more than individual speech. No
69. Aside from the Federal Corrupt Practices Acts, a number of states have passed
similar legislation limiting union and/or corporate spending in state elections. See
Bowe v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 320 Mass. 230, 252, 69 N.E.2d 115 (1946) ;
People v. Gansley, 191 Mich. 357, 158 N.W. 195 (1916) ; Garrett, Corporate Con-
tributions For Political Purposes, 14 Bus. LAW 365 (1959).
70. See, e.g., First Unitarian Church v. City of Los Angeles, 357 U.S. 545 (1958)
United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 612 (1954) ; International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v.
NLRB, 341 U.S. 694 (1954); NAACP v. Patty, 159 V. Supp. 503 (E.D. Va. 1958)
Noerr Motor Freight v. Eastern R.R. Pres. Conf., 155 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Pa. 1958);
International Longshoreman's Union v. Ackerman, 82 F. Supp. 65 (D. Hawaii 1949)
rev'd on other grounds, 187 F.2d 860 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 859 (1951) ;
Independent Serv. Corp. v. Tousant, 56 F. Supp. 75, 78 (D. Mass. 1944) (dictum per
Wyzanski, J.) ; McKay Jewelers Inc. v. Bowron, 19 Cal. 2d 595, 122 P.2d 543 (1942);
Baltimore v. A. S. Abell Co., 145 A.2d 111 (Md. 1958).
71. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1945) (Justice Murphy, speaking in
regard to a person who unsuccessfully invoked the Fifth amendment in refusing to
produce certain union records for the grand jury). See also Stapleton v. Mitchell, 60
F. Supp. 51 (D. Kan. 1945).
72. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (Thomas' free speech protected though
he was acting representatively in soliciting union membership) ; Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88 (1940) (Thornhill's free speech protected though he was picketing for a
labor union). See also cases cited in notes 14, 25, 27 and 29 supra, in which the cor-
poration was dismissed as a party, but the members acting as agents of the corporation
were allowed to maintain the action on the basis of their own first amendment rights.
73. The right to freedom of assembly is also protected against state action by the
fourteenth amendment due process clause. NAACP v. Patty, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) ; De Jong v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
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longer is the right to speech encompassed by freedom to mount a cracker
barrel. The ability to effectively express ideas and opinions is increasingly
dependent on the use of mass media of communication such as newspapers,
radio, television and motion pictures. These are seldom available to the
individual. 74 Often it is through corporations that the individual gains
access to such media. To deny the right to freedom of speech to the cor-
poration would be to deny to its members the fruits of this association.
It would be an infringement of the members' freedom of assembly, not-
withstanding the fact that they themselves are free to speak as individuals.
Thus it seems that the decided weight of authority is in favor of
recognizing the corporation's right to freedom of speech. Reason, as well
as precedent, substantiates this position. Whether such a right will be
more vigorously asserted in the future, and, if so, what success it will
have before the courts, which must balance the right of corporate ex-
pression against the need for state as well as federal control of these
entities, remains to be seen.
II.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE PROTECTION.
It was noted earlier that in certain instances a fundamental, consti-
tutional right will, under the same basic facts, be applied on behalf of
an individual and not on behalf of a corporation. Such is the case with
the right against self-incrimination. 75 The major portion of this Comment
has been directed toward disproving such a distinction in regard to the
right to freedom of speech. A further question necessarily presents itself:
assuming such a corporate right exists, is there any basis for distin-
guishing between the degree of protection to be afforded the corporate
right to free speech as opposed to the individual's right to free speech ?76
The question is deceptive, i.e., it assumes there is a distinction under
the first amendment between so-called corporate speech and individual
or personal speech. This is where many who would deny such a right
are mistaken. The first amendment contains no basis for a dichotomy be-
74. See Bowe v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 320 Mass. 230, 252, 69 N.E.2d
115, 130 (1946), where the court stated that "individuals seldom impress their views
upon the electorate without organization. They have a right to organize into parties
and even into what are called 'pressure groups' for the purpose of advancing causes
in which they believe. They have a right to engage in printing and circulating their
views and in advancing their cause in public assemblies and over the radio."
75. See note 9 supra, concerning the right against self incrimination. For a force-
ful argument against any analogy between these two rights as a basis for denying
freedom of speech to the corporation, see 57 YALE L. J. 806, 817, n. 39 (1948).
76. More specifically stated, the question might be, should traditional speech
doctrines such as the clear and present danger test or the preferential position of first
amendment rights be extended to protect corporate expression, or should the court
take a less serious view of the alleged infringement when a corporation is the sole
party asserting this right? See Judge Hinks remark in United States v. Painters
Local 481, 79 F. Supp. 516, 523 (D. Conn. 1948) rev'd on other grounds, 172 F.2d 854
(2d Cir. 1949) : "These reflections suggest that an aggregation may properly be subject
to more stringent regulations in the exercise of its freedom than an individual."
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tween the individual and the group to which he belongs. Constitutionally
protected speech transcends the individual and the group; it rests in society.
A legal writer expressed this well when analyzing the work of the
author of the clear and present danger test; he said "the great contribu-
tion of Mr. Justice Holmes was that he looked through the deceptively
simple language of the First Amendment to its plain purpose-the safe-
guarding of society's thinking process." 77
If freedom of speech under the first amendment were merely a per-
sonal right, a right of private parties, we might well ask who has it-does
the corporation have it? But constitutionally protected speech, in the
sense that it was intended to protect the social thinking process, is the
antithesis of a personal right. It was not intended merely to protect cer-
tain persons or certain groups. Constitutionally protected speech was
not placed in the first amendment to give an individual or a group the
right to gain some recovery from another. It was a deterrent to govern-
mental tyrnanny, not a compensation for personal injury. No one has
ever recovered a money judgment simply on the basis of the first amend-
ment. It was established as a protection, but a protection for the public
as well as the individual.78 In a real sense, every governmental act which
is found by the Supreme Court to constitute a violation of the first amend-
ment, is a violation of everyone's right to this constitutional freedom.79
Why then do we limit who may assert this right? Not because one
member of society or another has suffered no harm-but simply for prac-
tical reasons, i.e., to control the time, place and manner of suit. The law
presumes that the person most directly effected will seek to correct the
situation. 0 If he does not, the infringement necessarily continues. Gen-
erally, if such is the case, the infringement in terms of social import is
slight, and the social thinking process goes on.
How does this broad view of the first amendment fit in with the
problem of limiting the protection of corporate free speech? By shifting
our perspective to society as the thing harmed-rather than any par-
77. Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger-From Schenk to Dennis, 52 COLUM.
L. Rxv. 315, 317 (1952).
78. This aspect of free speech-the social aspect is more evident in regard to the
right to freedom of the press. Here we see a more critical need for viewing this right
as resting in society as well as in the individual, especially in a time when the free
press, though perhaps far more productive in terms of numbers of printed words, is
more and more controlled by a few. See Brown, Book Review, 57 YAL8 L.J. 894 (1948).
79. This broad view of first amendment protection follows from a recognition of
the concomitant right of freedom to hear, since the ability to speak is dependant on
the ability to hear and read. It is in this sense that one suffers from the forced silence
of another. In terms of the total social thinking process this injury is minute, but were
a large quantity of expression to be curtailed, this factor takes on real significance.
80. This idea is well brought out by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 153 (1951) (concurring opinion), in
discussing what is necessary for a party to have standing to raise constitutional issues.
He asserts the following as one necessary condition: "(b) Does the action challenged
affect petitioner with sufficient 'directness'? Frequently governmental action directly
affects the legal interests of some persons and causes only consequential detriment to
another. Whether the persons consequentially harmed can challenge the action is said
to depend on the directness of the impact of the action on him."
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ticular "individual", "citizen" or "person"-we are only incidentally con-
cerned with who may assert this right and are not likely to summarily deny
such a right to anyone. The result will be necessarily to increase the amount
of first amendment protection afforded to society. Thus, when the Court
is called upon to examine legislation which allegedly infringes upon con-
stitutionally protected free speech, it will ask two questions. First, has
the party standing to assert this right? (The Court may ask has the
party been injured ?-but this is really asking has the party been injured
more directly than the other injured members of society?). The answer
to this is important only as a procedural matter in limiting time, place,
and manner of suit. To say that a corporation, qua corporation, has no
standing to assert freedom of expression is arbitrary as well as unreason-
able, and will unnecessarily harm society since there are instances when
a corporation will be the only party in a position to assert the right. In
such an instance the infringement would necessarily go uncorrected.
The second question is, has the right of society been infringed. Here
the question of who can assert the right has absolutedly no significance.
To determine the answer to this we must look to a broader picture, to
other rights, to other freedoms. We must balance and adjust these other
rights and freedoms. Presumably there is a balance in which each is satis-
fied. We might call this a perfect society-in which there is a perfect
thinking process.
But this theory is admittedly abstract; and constitutional law, par-
ticularly in this field, has not been made by theory nor has it developed
in the abstract. An analysis of the cases involving corporations offers
little help other than to fail to produce any distinction in first amendment
protection, based on who is speaking. The law in each appears to follow
in the general spirit of past free-speech cases. 8' The one area which
possibly offers an exception to this is that involving unfair labor practice
charges under the National Labor Relations Act. As one reads these
cases, which for the most part are found in district and circuit courts, it
does not appear that the courts approached the problem of alleged free-
speech infringement with the sense of urgency or sensitivity so charac-
teristic of the Court which developed the clear and present danger rule
and the doctrine of preferential position of first amendment rights.8 2
81. Although the Court has evidenced no less viligence in corporate free speech
cases, nevertheless Congress has shown less restraint with respect to corporate speech
than an individual's speech. Thus in the Corrupt Practices Act, the individual is only
limited in the amount of money he may contribute to one particular election while the
corporation is absolutely prohibited from attempting in any way to influence the out-
come of certain federal elections. The latter restriction would obviously be invalid
were it applied to an individual. Whether this restriction will stand against attack
remains to be seen. See note 68 supra and related text.
82. See COMMENT, Employer Freedom of Steech in Labor Relations, 14 FORD. L.
Rev. 59 (1945), where the author after reviewing the Thomas v. Collins decision
and other decisions under the NLRA, and finding that the employee's free-speech rights
are zealously guarded by the court, concludes that ".... an employer would seem to be
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Proof of this seems to lie in the paradox of Congress being forced to the
aid of the employer's freedom of speech by way of amending the NLRA
to correct the numerous administrative and judicial decisions which were
so unsympathetic to this right.8 3 However, this does not justify the con-
clusion that a lesser degree of protection should be afforded to the cor-
poration, since presumably the sole proprietor's right in this setting was
no better treated. A more plausible explanation of these NLRA cases
would seem to lie in an analysis of the type of speech involved.8 4
Although an examination of these free-expression opinions seems
to provide no answer to this question, there are several well established
doctrines within the area of free speech which may in the future con-
stitute a basis for special limitations on corporate expression. There are
certain features particular to the corporation which necessitate its regula-
tion. When these features are present, the need for such regulation will
be balanced against its right to freedom of expression. Thus, corporations
are generally business activities conducted primarily for profit. In the
sense that their activity (expression) is "tainted with a commercial aspect",
they may be subject to reasonable regulation by the state or federal gov-
ernment.8 5 Again, a corporation may become so powerful as to threaten the
economic structure of the country. Here, the anti-trust laws will be applied
to limit its activity whether or not that activity takes the form of corporate
expression." Furthermore, corporate wealth expended in the area of
political expression may endanger the free electorate system by drowning
out the voice of the individual. Because of this, Congress and the states
have enacted corrupt practices acts to outlaw corporate expression in this
area. All of this, rather than substantiate any basis for a general distinc-
tion between corporate speech and an individual's speech, merely recog-
nizes the fact that free expression is not absolute but must be coordinated
with other needs of society. When the individual's expression evidences
a business nature or when such individual controls excessive economic
entitled to the same rights and privileges under the First Amendment as any other
group of citizens, including employees. But we are uncertain as to whether this is
actually the law."
83. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) c. 120, 61 Stat. 136(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) : "The expression of any views, arguments, or opinions,
or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic or visual form, shall
not constitute or be evidence of an. unfair labor practice . . .if such expression con-
tains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit."
84. The employer's speech takes on added significance by virtue of his relationship
with the employees. This view evolved the so called captive audience doctrine under
the original National Labor Relations Act. See Burke, Employe'r Free Speech, 26 FORD.
L. Rimv. 266 (1958).
85. See Valentine v. Christensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) ; Pittsford v. City of Los
Angeles, 50 Cal. App. 2d 25, 122 P.2d 535 (1942). But see Joseph Burstyn v. Wilson,
343 U.S. 495 (1952) ; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945) ("The idea is not
sound therefore that the first amendment safeguards are wholly inapplicable to busi-
ness or economic activity.").
86. Loraine Journal v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) ; Noerr Motor Freight
v. Eastern Railroad Pres. Conf., 155 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
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power, these same limitations will be placed upon his expression.8 7 The
question is not who is speaking but what part does that speech play in
the total social process.
III.
CONCLUSION.
If by law we mean how the court will dispose of a particular con-
troversy in the future, it appears evident that the law recognizes the cor-
poration's right to freedom of expression against both state and federal
action. As regards the latter there is no authority to the contrary. The
former is a consequence of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. What little authority there is to the contrary cannot be
viewed as controlling; first, because the basic premise on which these
cases rely, i.e., that the "liberty" of the fourteenth amendment due process
clause is liberty of natural and not artificial persons, has been expressly
rejected; and second, because there is a large body of case law which
can only be explained as a recognition of this right. Furthermore, the
freedom of speech provision of the first amendment should be viewed
broadly as a protection for the social thinking process. Since the modern
corporation often plays a vital part in this process, it would be unwise
to attach any general limitation upon the protection to be afforded cor-
porate expression as opposed to an individual's expression. Particularly
is this true today when effective expression is so often dependent on
group action and mass media of communication have made many tradi-
tional concepts of free speech anochronistic.
Gerald R. Stockman
EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF HEARSAY-A COMPARISON OF
SOME OF THE UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE
AND PENNSYLVANIA LAW.
In the first issue of this volume of the VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
there appeared a Comment under the same topical heading as above.'
That Comment compared the exceptions to the hearsay rule embodied
in the Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 63(1) through Rule 63(13),
with the existing Pennsylvania Law. The present writing will compare
87. An interesting argument may be made for differentiating between the freedom
of speech protected by virtue of the fourteenth amendment against state action and
that protected against the federal government by virtue of the first amendment. See
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (dictum by Holmes J.) ; Beauharnais
v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 287, 290, 295 (1952) (dissent by Jackson J.); Kozol, Abandon-
ment of Incorporation Theory, 67 HARV. L. RZv. 1018, 1019, 1022 (1953).
1. See Comment, 4 VILL. L.R. 117 (1958).
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the remaining exceptions stated in Rule 63 (14) through Rule 63 (31 ).2
The intention is to show the similarities and conflicts between the rules
formulated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and the common-law or statutory rules now of authority in
Pennsylvania.
The general scope and form of the prior Comment will be retained
in this concluding Comment, and thus the relative merits and the historical
background of the various rules compared will not be dealt with here.
I.
HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS.
A.
Absence of Entry in Business Records.
Rule 63(14): Evidence of the absence of a memorandum or
record from the memoranda or records of a business of an asserted
act, event or condition, to prove the non-occurrence of the act or
event, or the non-existence of the condition, if the judge finds that
it was the regular course of that business to make such memoranda
of all such acts, events or conditions at the time thereof or within
a reasonable time thereafter, and to preserve them.
Although there is very little Pennsylvania authority on this point,
it appears that such evidence would be admissible when properly proved.
The main case in point was one where employment records were admitted
to show that an alleged negligent servant was not in the employ of the
defendant at the time of the accident.8
It would seem, therefore, that Rule 63(14) would not constitute
a change in the Pennsylvania view; however, it would clarify certain
existing doubt on the point caused by some older authority.
4
2. The following subsections have not been discussed in this Comment: 63(19)
which deals with records of documents affecting an interest in property (in Pennsyl-
vania, such documents would be governed by one of numerous statutes); 63(22)
which deals with judgments determining a public interest in land (although no cases
have been found on point, such would probably be admissible in Pennsylvania).
See Northup v. Pike Township, 242 Pa. 1, 88 At. 781 (1913).
3. Klein v. Woolworth, 309 Pa. 320, 163 Atl. 532 (1932).
4. See Commonwealth v. Berney, 28 Pa. Super. 61 (1905), where, in a larceny
case, records of a railroad yard car inspection were held inadmissible to show that
the seals on freight cars were intact when they arrived in the yard and that, there-
fore, the larceny must have occurred within the yard. However, the inadmissibility
seems to have hinged on the fact that the clerk had made up the records from
reports of inspectors and that, therefore, the party making the entries did not have
personal knowledge of the facts. See also, Keim v. Rush, 5 W. & S. 377, (Pa. 1843).
The Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act does not cover this problem, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 916 (Supp. 1957).
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B.
Reports and Findings of Public Officials.
Rule 63(15): Subject to Rule 645 written reports or findings
of fact made by a public official of the United States or of a state
or territory of the United States, if the judge finds that the making
thereof was within the scope of the duty of such official and that it
was his duty (a) to perform the act reported, or (b) to observe the
act, condition or event reported, or (c) to investigate the facts con-
cerning the act, condition or event and to make findings or draw
conclusions based on such investigation.
In the absence of a statute governing the particular report or finding,
of which there are many in this field,6 Pennsylvania is not as liberal as
Rule 63(15). Reports or written findings made by a public official have
generally been held admissible only where it was found to be the duty of
the reporting official to do or to observe the recorded occurrence. It is
essential that he be found to have first-hand knowledge of the act, con-
dition, or event reported.7 Therefore, where the reports are based pri-
marily or even partially on the statements of others and the reporting
official has no personal knowledge of the facts, such reports will be held
inadmissible under the hearsay rule.8
Thus, adoption of section (c) of Rule 63(15) of the Uniform Rules
of Evidence would result in a liberalization as to the admissibility of such
reports and findings, since under this rule the necessity of first-hand knowl-
edge is dispensed with.9
5. See note 9 infra.
6. See 1 HENRY, PENNSYLVANIA EVIDENCE § 369 (1953).
7. Often such reports are admitted as public records. See Lagnisky v. McCol-
lough, 280 Pa. 286, 124 Atl. 431 (1924), (school records); Haas v. Kasnot, 271
Pa. 570, 92 A.2d 171 (1952) (adopting the rule of Nolt v. Crow, 22 Pa. Super. 113
(1903), that weather reports of the United States Weather Bureau are public records).
In Vantell v. Black Top Paving Co., 80 Pa. D. & C. 54 (C.P. Mercer 1952), the re-
quirements of the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
28, § 916 (Supp. 1957), were applied allowing the admission of a state highway in-
spector's diary, which was kept as required, in the course of business and in which
were recorded his personal observations.
8. See Haas v. Kasnot, 371 Pa. 570, 92 A.2d 171 (1952). See also Golab v.
Romig, 78 Pa. D. & C. 30 (C.P. Lehigh 1951).
9. UNIFORM RULES or EVIDENcE, Rule 63(15), comment, (1953). See also Rule
64, which is applicable to Rules 63(15) through 63(19) and which provides that
any writing admissible under these rules "shall be received only if the party offering
such writing has delivered a copy of it, or so much thereof as may relate to the
controversy, to each adverse party a reasonable time before trial unless the judge
finds that such adverse party has not been unfairly surprised by the failure to de-
liver such copy." This gives the adverse party an opportunity to summon the re-
porter or those who gave the information reported.
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C.
Filed Reports, Made by Persons Exclusively Authorized.
Rule 63(16): Subject to Rule 64,10 writings made as a record,
report or finding of fact, if the judge finds that (a) the maker was
authorized by statute to perform, to the exclusion of persons not so
authorized, the functions reflected in the writing, and was required
by statute to file in a designated public office a written report of
specified matters relating to the performance of such functions, and
(b) the writing was made and filed as so required by the statute.
Under the Pennsylvania statute governing the registration of vital
statistics," various persons or officers are required to file reports in the
form of certificates concerning births,1 2 deaths, 1  marriages,'1 4 and certain
other personal or statistical particulars in prescribed situations. 15 Although
the act expressly makes such reports admissible as prima facie evidence
of all the facts therein reported,' 6 there is a serious question as to its
constitutionality since the title of the act gives no notice of a change in
the rules of evidence. The question has often been noted in the cases but
has never been decided.17 The result of the decisions has been a restriction
or limitation on the effect of the statute, since generally such filed reports
are admitted only to show the fact which caused their existence but not
collateral facts appearing in them.' 8 This was the rule under the common
law.19
In any event, in accord with Rule 63(16) it is clear that such filed
reports are admissible in evidence, although to what extent is unsettled.
If the wording of the statute were given full effect, Pennsylvania would
10. See note 9 supra.
11. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 451-505.35 (1949).
12. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 463 (1949).
13. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 457, 458 (1949).
14. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 505.30 (1949).
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 461, 467 (1949).
16. "The Department of Health shall, upon request and the payment of a fee
as hereinafter provided, furnish any applicant a certified record of any birth, death
or marriage registered under provisions of this act . . . and any such copy of the
record of birth, or death, or marriage, when properly certified by the Department
of Health to be a true copy thereof, shall be prima facie evidence in all courts and
places of the facts therein stated .... " PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 471 (1949). (Em-
phasis added.)
17. See BROWN, PENNSYLVANIA EVIDENCE 188 (1949).
18. Lederer v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 135 Pa. Super. 61, 4 A.2d 608 (1939);
Griffin v. National Mining Co., 127 Pa. Super. 588, 193 Atl. 447 (1937) ; Trotter v.
Industrial Health, Acc. and Life Ins. Co., 115 Pa. Super. 487, 175 Atl. 884 (1935);
Allegheny Trust Co. v. State Life Ins. Co., 110 Pa. Super. 37, 167 Atl. 251 (1933);
Borgon v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 99 Pa. Super. 377 (1930). See also
Heffron v. Prudential Ins. Co., 137 Pa. Super. 69, 8 A.2d 491 (1939). A death
certificate was admitted to prove a fact (death), the cause (drowning), but not
the manner (accident or suicide).
19. Dinan v. Mutual Benefit Ass'n, 201 Pa. 363, 50 Atl. 999 (1902) ; Marks
Appeal, 121 Pa. Super. 181, 183 Atl. 432 (1936).
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be in line with Rule 63(17)20 since under that rule all the facts of those
records admitted under Rule 63(16), are admissible in evidence when the
record is authenticated. However, as the case law now stands, Pennsyl-
vania seems to be less liberal, since collateral facts in the report would
not be admitted as proof of those facts.
D.
Certificate of Marriage.
Rule 63(18): Subject to Rule 6421 certificates that the maker
thereof performed a marriage ceremony, to prove the truth of the
recitals thereof, if the judge finds that (a) the maker of the certificate
at the time and place certified as the time and place of the marriage
was authorized by law to perform marriage ceremonies, and (b) the
certificate was issued at that time or within a reasonable time there-
after.
This exception applies only to marriage certificates which are un-
recorded.22 In Pennsylvania where a certificate is given into the possession
of the parties the statute would not control,23 and the admissibility of
that certificate would depend on the common-law rule. Such an unrecorded
marriage certificate has been said to be inadmissible if offered by itself.2 4
However, they have been admitted where offered as an admission 25 or
where possession of certificate combined with other conduct makes it allow-
able as corroborative evidence. 26
Therefore, although the general common-law rule in Pennsylvania
would seem to be different, in actual result, Pennsylvania is not in dis-
agreement with Rule 63(18) which would admit these certificates without
qualification.
20. UNIFORM RULES oF EVIDENcE, Rule 63(17): "Content of Official Record.
Subject to Rule 64, (a) if meeting the requirements of authentication under Rule 68,
to prove the content of the record, a writing purporting to be a copy of an official
record or of an entry therein, (b) to prove the absence of a record in a specified
office, a writing made by the official custodian of the official records of the office,
reciting diligent search and failure to find such record." For other Pennsylvania
records required by statute and their value as evidence see 1 HENRY, PENNSYLVANIA
EVIDENCE § 369 (1953).
21. See note 9 supra.
22. See UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENcE, Rule 63(18), comment, (1953). As to
certificates which are recorded, certified copies are admissible in Pennsylvania as
prima facie evidence of the marriage. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 9 (1952). See also
Rule 63(16) supra.
23. Under the statute the celebrant is required to make up duplicate certificates,
one of which must be returned and recorded. There is no direction made as to the
other copy; presumably, it will be given to the parties. PA. STrAT. ANN. tit. 48, §§ 1,
7 (1952).
24. See Dailey v. Frey, 206 Pa. 227, 55 At. 962 (1903); Hill v. Hill, 32 Pa.
511 (1859).
25. Hill v. Hill, 32 Pa. 511 (1859) (alleged husband of intestate was shown
to have read it to his brother as a certificate of his marriage).
26. Dailey v. Frey, 206 Pa. 227, 55 Atl. 962 (1903) (certificate had been in
possession of plaintiff's father and plaintiff claimed it to be his certificate). See
also 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1645 (3d ed. 1940).
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E.
Judgment of Previous Conviction.
Rule 63(20): Evidence of a final judgment adjudging a person
guilty of a felony, to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment.
The long established Pennsylvania view is that judgments in criminal
cases are generally inadmissible to establish the facts in a civil case.27
However, it would seem that this common-law rule is subject to both
statutory28 and judicial exception. The judicial exceptions are based on
policy considerations relevant to the situations confronted. An example
would be those situations where the party convicted now attempts to profit
by the act, the commission of which caused his conviction.2 9 While there
has been recent judicial statements that the rule is not so well settled as
previously believed,30 it nevertheless is recognized as the prevailing view
in Pennsylvania. 31
The recognition of Rule 63(20) in Pennsylvania would, therefore,
be a substantial change in the law as it stands today. Evidence of a con-
viction for a felony would then be made admissible to prove any fact which
was necessarily shown in order to obtain the judgment.32
27. Zubrod v. Kuhn, 357 Pa. 200, 53 A.2d 604 (1947); Nowak v. Orange, 349
Pa. 217, 36 A.2d 781 (1944); Wingrove v. Central Pennsylvania Traction Co., 237
Pa. 549, 85 Atl. 850 (1912); Summers v. Brewing Co., 143 Pa. 114, 22 Atl. 707
(1891) ; Bennet v. Fulmer, 49 Pa. 155 (1865) ; Porter v. Seiler, 23 Pa. 424 (1854).
28. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 51 (1930) provides, "Records of Adultery. When
the respondent in any action of divorce shall have been convicted and sentenced for
adultery, the records of the said conviction shall be received in evidence on any
application for a divorce by the injured libellant." See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
§ 441 (1941).
29. See Greifer's Estate, 333 Pa. 278, 5 A.2d 118 (1939) (a wife who had
been convicted of murdering her husband was not allowed to benefit under a trust
created by him for her benefit) ; Mineo v. Eureka Security Fire and Marine Ins.
Co., 182 Pa. Super. 75, 86, 125 A.2d 612, 618 (1956) (party suing on an insurance
policy had been convicted of setting the fire which caused the damage, the court
said: "We are of the opinion that one who is convicted of a felony and subsequently
attempts to benefit from the commission, the record of his guilt should be a bar to
his recovery.")
30. Mineo v. Eureka Security Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 182 Pa. Super. 75,
81, 125 A.2d 612, 616 (1956) (where it was said: "This rule, however, is subject
to numerous exceptions and the tendency of recent court decisions is away from it."
. 31. Philadelphia Transp. Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 186
Pa. Super. 142, 141 A.2d 410 (1958), This opinion was written by the same judge
responsible for the previously quoted opinion, supra, note 27.
32. It is interesting to observe that while under the liberality of Rule 63(20)
and the comment thereto, even traffic violation convictions would not be admissible
in civil cases for damages; there is some Pennsylvania lower court authority which
would allow such if there was a guilty plea as an admission against interest. Manigley
v. Jefferson, 9 Pa. D. & C.2d 187 (C.P. Phila. 1956) ; Smith v. Kurtz, 34 Pa.
D. & C. 439 (C.P. Bucks 1938). However, if the violation was under the Pennsyl-
vania Motor Vehicle Code such is not admissible. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 738.1
(1953).
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F.
Judgments Against Persons Entitled to Indemnity.
Rule 63(21): To prove the wrong of the adverse party and the
amount of damages sustained by the judgment creditor, evidence
of a final judgment if offered by a judgment debtor in an action in
which he seeks to recover partial or total indemnity or exoneration
for money paid or liability incurred by him because of the judgment,
provided the judge finds that the judgment was rendered for dam-
ages sustained by the judgment creditor as a result of the wrong
of the adverse party to the present action.
This rule would seem to state the existing law in Pennsylvania. As
early as 1881 it was stated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that "a
judgment recovered against a surety is always evidence in an action by
him against his principal." 33 In another early case, it was held that such
a judgment was clearly admissible in evidence and that it fixed the amount
for which the judgment debtor was held as surety and hence the amount
which he was obliged to pay.3 4 These early cases show strict agreement
with the proposed rule and there would seem to be no controversy on the
point.3
5
G.
Statement Concerning One's Own Family History.
Rule 63(23) : A statement of a matter concerning a declarant's
own birth, marriage, divorce, legitimacy, relationship by blood or
marriage, race-ancestry or other similar fact of his family history,
even though the declarant had no means of acquiring personal knowl-
edge of the matter declared, if the judge finds that the declarant is
unavailable.
The proposed rules now under discussion have adopted basically the
rule of the Model Code of Evidence concerning declarations of family
history or, as more commonly called, pedigree. However, the new rules
have divided the Model Code rule for the sake of clarity and easier appli-
cation. 36 The first rule, stated above, expresses a liberal view as to the
admissibility of such statements. Especially important is the fact that this
33. Lacock v. Commonwealth, 99 Pa. 207, 210 (1881).
34. Murphy v. Jones, 6 Atl. 726 (Pa. 1886).
35. See Fayette Title & Trust Co. v. Nelson, 114 Pa. Super. 402, 174 Atl. 599
(1934).
36. See UNIFORM RULES or EvIDENcE, Rule 63(23), comment, (1953) which
explains the division of Rule 524 of the MODEL CODE oF EvIDENCE (1942) into Rules
63(23), (24), (25), and (26).
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rule would allow statements to be admitted where the declarant was merely
unavailable and not necessarily deceased.
The Pennsylvania cases agree with the proposed rule as to what
matters are so admissible. The cases have allowed statements as to age37
and relationship.88 In so doing they have approved the application of an
exception to all facts of pedigree, which under Pennsylvania authority
includes not only descent and relationship but also the facts of birth,
marriage and death and the time when such took place.39 However, it
would seem clear that in Pennsylvania the declarant must be deceased in
order to have his statements admitted under the exception. Although
there are no cases which raise the question whether unavailability will
suffice, death of the declarant has been uniformly listed as a requisite. 40
This uniform rule, then, would constitute a change in Pennsylvania law
as it now stands.
H.
Statement Concerning Family History of Another.
Rule 63(24): A statement concerning the birth, marriage, di-
vorce, death, legitimacy, race-ancestry, relationship by blood or mar-
riage or other similar fact of the family history of a person other than
the declarant if the judge (a) finds that the declarant was related to
the other by blood or marriage or finds that he was otherwise so in-
timately associated with the other's family as to be likely to have
accurate information concerning the matter declared, and made the
statement as upon information received from the other or from a
person related by blood or marriage to the other, or as upon repute
in the other's family, and (b) finds that the declarant is unavailable
as a witness.
Here again, as in Rule 63 (23), the subject matter of such declarations
is not a point of conflict between the rules and the existing Pennsylvania
law.41 However, in Pennsylvania the declarations of a party as to pedigree
are admissible under the general exception concerning pedigree only
where they were made before the controversy arose, or as is frequently
said, "ante litem motam;" only where the declarant is dead; and only
37. District of Columbia's Appeal, 343 Pa. 65, 21 A.2d 883 (1941); Simon v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 70 Pa. Super. 408 (1918).
38. Garrett Estate, 371 Pa. 284, 89 A.2d 531 (1952) (testimony by a daughter
as to declarations of her father that he was a nephew of another party was held
to be admissible where relevant).
39. American Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Rosenagle, 77 Pa. 507 (1875) ; Simon
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 70 Pa. Super. 408 (1918).
40. See Garrett Estate, 371 Pa. 284, 89 A.2d 531 (1952) ; Sitler v. Gehr, 105
Pa. 577 (1884); Gerrity v. Sovereign Camp, 85 Pa. Super. 288 (1925). See also 1
HENRY, PENNSYLVANIA EVIDENCE § 450 (1953).
41. See American Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Rosenagle, 77 Pa. 507 (1875) ; Simon
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 70 Pa. Super. 408 (1918).
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where the declarant was related to the family of which he spoke. 42 This
relationship must be proved by evidence separate and distinct from the
declaration itself. These requisites were early established and have been
repeatedly affirmed by the Pennsylvania authorities ;43 no exceptions have
been found to these requirements. Thus, there are two areas of essential
disagreement between the new rules and the prevailing Pennsylvania
view, that is, the necessity of relationship and death of the declarant.
Rule 63(24), consistent with Rule 63(23), requires only unavailability
and would allow statements of unrelated declarants. Therefore, there
would seem to be no question but that the adoption of the Uniform Rules
of Evidence would result in an important change liberalizing the admis-
sibility of such declarations in Pennsylvania.
Rule 63(25)44 applies to both Rules 63(23) and 63(24). It would
admit testimony that a statement which would be admissible under the
above rules was made by another declarant providing both declarants
are unavailable. In Pennsylvania, research has revealed no cases expressly
allowing this multiple type hearsay. However, because of the existing re-
quirements of relationship and death, it would appear that most cases
of this type would be disposed of under the exception for reputation in
the family concerning pedigree or family history, since both declarants
would have to be dead members of the family spoken of. This would
not be true under the uniform rule which does not require such relationship
or apparent death of the declarant.
I.
Reputation in Family Concerning Family History.
Rule 63(26): Evidence of reputation among members of a
family, if the reputation concerns the birth, marriage, divorce, death,
legitimacy, race-ancestry, or other fact of the family history of a
member of the family by blood or marriage.
In Pennsylvania, where there is no better evidence available, it has
generally been held that proof of pedigree, which includes descent, rela-
tionship, birth, marriage and death may be established by general repute
42. The requirement of relationship applies to the declarant not to the party
testifying as to the declaration. Gerrity v. Sovereign Camp, 85 Pa. Super. 288 (1925).
43. See Garrett Estate, 372 Pa. 438, 94 A.2d 357 (1953) (statements by close
neighbors, but unrelated by blood or marriage, as to family pedigree of another
were held inadmissible). See also, Garrett Estate, 371 Pa. 284, 89 A.2d 531 (1952)
Link's Estate, 319 Pa. 513, 180 At. 1 (1935) ; Sitler v. Gehr, 105 Pa. 577 (1884)
Gerrity v. Sovereign Camp, 85 Pa. Super. 288 (1925); BROWN, PENNSYLVANIA
EVIDENCE 166 (1949) ; 1 HENRY, PENNSYLVANIA EvIDENCE § 450 (1953).
44. "Statement Concerning Family History based on Statement of Another
Declarant. A statement of a declarant that a statement admissible under exceptions
(23) or (24) of this rule was made by another declarant, offered as tending to prove
the truth of the matter declared by both declarants, if the judge finds that both
declarants are unavailable as witnesses." UNIFORM RULES OV EVIDENCE, Rule 63(25),
(1953).
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in the family emanating from persons connected with the family by blood
or marriage.45 With the Pennsylvania rule stated in this manner, it would
seem that the uniform rule would be in complete alignment with it. How-
ever, there has been some intimation in the cases that in Pennsylvania
the party testifying as to the reputation within the family must be related
to that family by blood or marriage.48 There are no cases directly on
point, and those cases which allow testimony of a. non-relative under
this family reputation exception could just as easily have reached the
same result under those hearsay exceptions which allow testimony by
others as to the declarations of a deceased member of the family.47 This
failure to distinguish between reputation and declarations of family members
leaves the question in doubt.
Since the Uniform Rules of Evidence have taken a consistently liberal
view, it would seem clear that under Rule 63(26) it was. not intended
that the witness be required to qualify as a member of the family involved.
Thus, there would be a conflict between the two views, although neither
expressly deals with the problem.
J.
Reputation-Boundaries, General History, Family History.
Rule 63(27): Evidence of reputation in a community as tend-
ing to prove the truth of the matter reputed, if (a) the reputation
concerns boundaries of, or customs affecting, land in the community,
and the judge finds that the reputation, if any, arose before contro-
versy, or (b) the reputation concerns an event of general history
of the community or of the state or nation of which the community
is a part, and the judge finds that the event was of importance to
the community, or (c) the reputation concerns the birth, marriage,
divorce, death, legitimacy, relationship by blood or marriage, or race-
ancestry of a person resident in the community at the time of the
reputation, or some other similar fact of his family history or of his
personal status or condition which the judge finds likely to have
been the subject of a reliable reputation in that community.
In Pennsylvania it has always been the accepted view that where the
transaction involved is so remote as to be incapable of direct proof by
living witnesses or by usual documentary evidence, reputation evidence
45. See Picken's Estate, 163 Pa. 14, 29 Atl. 875 (1894) ; American Life Ins.
Co. v. Rosenagle, 77 Pa. 507 (1875); Cupryk v. National Union, 66 Pa. Super.
595 (1917).
46. In re McKee's Estate, 378 Pa. 607, 108 A.2d 214 (1954) (kin were competent
to testify as to pedigree and family tree). See also American Life Ins. Co. v.
Rosenagle, 77 Pa. 507 (1875), in which it was said that facts of repute in the family
may be shown by a surviving member.
47. See Picken's Estate, 163 Pa. 14, 29 Atl. 875 (1894) ; Arnold v. Ins. Co.,
20 Pa. Super. 61 (1902).
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is entitled to respect where the question is one of establishment of boun-
daries, 4 but not where the question is as to title.49 Hence, Pennsylvania,
in accord with most states, 50 would be in line with clause (a) of Rule
63(27).
Clause (b) of Rule 63(27) allows evidence of reputation concerning
an event of general and important history in the community. Although
Pennsylvania authority is extremely meager, apparently such evidence
would be admissible;51 and therefore, there is no existing conflict between
the state authority and the uniform, rule.
Since Pennsylvania does allow the common-law marriage, general
community reputation evidence is admitted to prove or disprove the pres-
ence of the necessary elements of reputation (i.e. the holding out of another
as his spouse) and cohabitation. 52 However, this is as far as Pennsylvania
goes in admitting general reputation evidence to show facts of family
history. As discussed previously, reputation within the family is admissible
to show family history and pedigree. Clause (c), then, would extend
admissibility of community reputation to a far greater degree than does
Pennsylvania law at the present time.
K.
Reputation as to Character.
Rule 63(28): If a trait of a person's character at a specified
time is material, evidence of his reputation with reference thereto
at a relevant time in the community in which he then resided or in
a group with which he then habitually associated, to prove the truth
of the matter reputed.
Generally, in Pennsylvania evidence of character is inadmissible in
civil cases unless directly in issue or involved in the nature of the pro-
ceedings. 53 In criminal cases, character would usually be relevant, but
its use is limited.54 In any case, where such evidence is allowed, the
established method of proving character is by showing the general repu-
tation of the person in the neighborhood in which he lives, at or about
48. Hostetter v. Commonwealth, 367 Pa. 603, 80 A.2d 719 (1951); McClausland
v. Fleming, 63 Pa. 36 (1869); Nieman v. Ward, 1 W. & S. 68 (Pa. 1841).
49. Sample v. Robb, 16 Pa. 305 (1851) ; School Dist. of Donegal Township v.
Crosby, 178 Pa. Super. 30, 112 A.2d 645 (1955).
50. See UNIFORM RULES ov EVIDENcE, Rule 63(27), comment, (1953).
51. See In re Old Eagle School Property, 36 W.N.C. 348 (C.P. Chest., Pa. 1895).
52. McGrath's Estate, 319 Pa. 309, 179 Atl. 599 (1935) ; Craig's Estate, 273
Pa. 530, 117 At. 221 (1922) ; Richard v. Brehm, 73 Pa. 140 (1873) ; Commonwealth
v. Stump, 53 Pa. 132 (1866). For a case in which reputation was used to negative
such a marriage see Horton Estate, 357 Pa. 30, 52 A.2d 895 (1947).
53. American Fire Ins. Co. v. Hazen, 110 Pa. 530, 1 Atl. 605 (1885) ; McCom-
mon v. Johnson, 123 Pa. Super. 581, 187 At. 445 (1936).
54. See 1 HENRY, PENNSYLVANIA EVIDENCE 159 (1953).
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the time the act under investigation was committed, 55 and in respect to
the particular characteristic or trait which is the subject matter of the
investigation.5 6 The important fact is that it must be a general reputation,
that is, what people say of him. It cannot be shown by testimony as to
specific acts.
57
The only conflict with Rule 63(28) is that it allows reputation among
the party's intimate associates to be admitted. In effect this would violate
the settled rule that it is not the personal opinion of the witness but rather
the general reputation which the party enjoys in the community that is
admissible.58 It would appear that a party's reputation among intimate
associates would necessarily be based on personal knowledge of specific
acts and would not be the required general consensus of opinion of the
community. However, a personal friend is allowed to testify as to a party's
general reputation.
L.
Recitals in Documents Affecting Property.
Rule 63(29): Evidence of a statement relevant to a material
matter, contained in a deed of conveyance or a will or other docu-
ment purporting to affect an interest in property, offered as tending
to prove the truth of the matter stated, if the judge finds that the
matter stated would be relevant upon an issue as to an interest in
the property, and that the dealings with the property since the state-
ment was made have not been inconsistent with the truth of the
statement.
This rule would allow recitals in documents affecting property to be
used as evidence whenever such would be relevant, regardless of the age
of the document. The only qualification required is that subsequent deal-
ings concerning the property be consistent with the recital.
Such a rule would conflict with the present Pennsylvania view,
Pennsylvania would allow such recitals as admissions of the facts so stated
only if they are contained in deeds to which the person against whom it
is offered is a party.5 9 As a general rule, recitals in deeds are inadmissible
hearsay with respect to third parties and those who claim by a title para-
55. Hopkins v. Tate, 255 Pa. 56, 99 Atl. 210 (1916) (a slander and libel suit
in which evidence of a bad reputation for honesty in another neighborhood eleven
years prior was held inadmissible as not being his general reputation where he re-
sided at the time of the act complained of).
56. Commonwealth v. Barnak, 357 Pa. 391, 54 A.2d 865 (1947) ; Commonwealth
v. Prophet, 307 Pa. 122, 160 Atl. 597 (1932); Alexander v. Commonwealth, 105 Pa.
1 (1884); Commonwealth v. Stefanowicz, 118 Pa. Super. 79, 179 Atl. 770 (1935).
57. Commonwealth v. Jones, 280 Pa. 368, 124 Atl. 486 (1924); Commonwealth
v. Hurt, 163 Pa. Super. 232, 60 A.2d 828 (1948); Commonwealth v. Visatsley, 129
Pa. Super. 86, 195 Atl. 148 (1937).
58. Commonwealth v. Gaines, 167 Pa. Super. 485, 75 A.2d 617 (1950).
59. Tursi v. Parry, 135 Pa. Super. 285, 5 A.2d 399 (1939).
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mount to the deed.80 But, where it is an ancient deed accompanied by
possession of the land, recitals therein are admissible as evidence of the
facts recited even against third persons.6 ' So, in Pennsylvania, if the
documents containing the recitals do not qualify as admissions, they must
meet the requirements of age and possession to be admissible and it is
in this regard that Pennsylvania law differs from Rule 63(29).
M.
Commercial Lists and the Like.
Rule 63(30): Evidence of statements of matters of interest to
persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, peri-
odical, or other published compilation to prove the truth of any rele-
vant matter so stated if the judge finds that the compilation is pub-
lished for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally
used and relied upon by them.
This proposed rule would create a general exception to the hearsay
rule in order to admit commonly used commercial publications. Pennsyl-
vania does not have such a general exception. In this state the docu-
ments are treated individually, and admission is not the usual result. Even
where admitted, the use and weight to be given them is usually limited.
For instance, mortality tables published for use in the insurance field
are admissible but only for limited purposes, and all the factors which
tend to limit their application to the pending case must be pointed out
to the jury in the judge's instructions.6 2 Also, publications which contain
market quotations have been held admissible both by judicial decision 3
and by statute,6 4 but only for the purpose of proving market value.
Thus, the proposed rule would make a great change in the law of
Pennsylvania concerning the admissibility of commercial publications, lists
and the like.
N.
Learned Treatises.
Rule 63(31): A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a
subject of history, science or art to prove the truth of a matter stated
60. Tate v. Clement, 176 Pa. 550, 35 Atd. 214 (1896); Muhlenberg v. Drucken-
miller, 103 Pa. 631 (1883) ; Jeck v. Woods, 29 Pa. 375 (1857). See also Boyer
v. Smith, 3 Watts 449 (Pa. 1835) (applying same rule to wills).
61. Brock v. Atlantic Refining Co., 273 Pa. 76, 116 Ati. 552 (1922) ; Dougherty
v. Welshams, 233 Pa. 121, 81 Atl. 997 (1912); James v. Lentzler, 8 W. & S. 192
(Pa. 1844); Fauz v. Cooke, 107 Pa. Super. 88, 163 Atl. 384 (1933).
62. See DiPietro v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 315 Pa. 209, 173 Atl.
165 (1934); McCaffrey v. Schwartz, 285 Pa. 561, 132 Atl. 810 (1926) ; McKenna
v. Citizens' Natural Gas Co., 198 Pa. 31, 47 Atl. 990 (1900).
63. Seward v. Penna. Salt Mfg. Co., 78 Pa. Super. 319 (1922).
64. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-724 (1954).
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therein if the judge takes judicial notice, or a witness expert in the
subject testifies, that the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is a reliable
authority in the subject.
This uniform rule would admit learned treatises under alternate re-
quirements-either through judicial notice by a judge or by testimony
of another expert in the field as to the authority's reliability.
Although authority is meager, there are intimations that Pennsyl-
vania agrees with both these alternatives. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has affirmed the admission of books of authority by a judge in order
to aid him in taking judicial notice of the facts therein stated.6 5 In a
recent lower court case, later affirmed by the state supreme court on
other grounds, a treatise was admitted upon the testimony of an expert
as to the standing and qualification of the author.06
Thus, Pennsylvania law would probably admit such evidence under
the same conditions as Rule 63(31).
William E. Mowatt
SALES-RETAIL INSTALMENT SALES-CONSUMER PROTECTION IN
PENNSYLVANIA.
Specific statutory protection afforded a consumer instalment purchaser
has been gradually extended during the past twenty-five years.' At one
time a consumer buying on the instalment plan was often cast in the role
of a weak, oppressed, and comparatively helpless victim at the mercy of
a ruthless and wily seller ;2 he has since been supplied with a more or less
effective array of defensive legal weapons for protection in the event a
depredatory seller may still be encountered. However, no matter the
character of the participants, the enormous importance of instalment credit
in consumer goods, and its continued well-being in today's economy, would
seem to supply reason enough for an adequate measure of detailed statutory
control in this area.3
65. Siemens' Estate, 346 Pa. 610, 613, 31 A.2d 280, 282 (1943): "The court
may inform itself from books of authority, though not introduced in evidence, or
may admit such works to aid it in the exercise of its judicial function."
66. Cott Beverage Corp. v. Horst, 67 Dauph. 18 (C.P., Pa. 1954), aff'd, 380
Pa. 113, 110 A.2d 405 (1954). See also, 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1691, 1694 (3d
ed. 1940).
1. Indiana appears to have passed the first such legislation in 1935. Mors,
State Regjulation of Retail Instalment Financing-Progress and Problems, 23 J. Bus.
U. Ciii. 199 (1950).
2. See Nugent and Henderson, Instalment Selling and the Consumer: A Brief
for Regulation, 173 ANNALS 93 (1934).
3. Consumer instalment credit outstanding as of August 1958 was estimated at
14.6 billion dollars for automobile paper, and at 8.3 billion dollars for other con-
sumer goods paper. Fto. ReSERVE BULL. 1204 (Oct. 1958).
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With the passage in 1947 of the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act,4
Pennsylvania acquired comprehensive legislation regulating all aspects, in-
cluding the finance charge, of automobile instalment sales. Since automobile
financing comprised a substantial part of all consumer instalment sales,
it was not unnatural that it be singled out initially for detailed regulation. 5
However, such action would have been thought to augur similar legislation
for all consumer instalment sales in the not too distant future. It has yet
to come. The fact that over one-half of all consumer instalment sales of
goods are not comprehended" by the existing legislation presents a ques-
tionable incompleteness. To deny comparable safeguards to all consumer
buyers on an equal basis cannot be justified.
The Department of Banking of the Commonwealth in a report to the
outgoing governor this past year, recommended that legislation comparable
to the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act be extended to all consumer in-
stalment sales of goods in Pennsylvania. In view of the great significance
to the general buying public that such action would have, eventual passage
of such legislation seems inevitable. It is the purpose of this Comment
to review briefly consumer instalment regulation, past, present, and pro-
spective, with a view towards pointing up the present disparity in pro-
tection afforded consumer instalment buyers in Pennsylvania.
I.
THE INSTALMENT SALE AND THE BAILMENT LEASE.
The instalment sale by its nature is peculiarly well suited to deception
and overreaching. 7 This has been compounded in Pennsylvania by casting
such sales in the form of bailment leases.8 The inequality in the bargain-
ing positions of a buyer and seller in the ordinary instalment sale9 is much
the same as it is in the case of a cash loan, since the urge to acquire
goods, especially in our modern environment, may well be as compelling
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §§ 601-637 (Supp. 1958) [hereinafter cited in foot-
notes as MVSFA].
5. In the Summary Report of the Joint State Government Commission to the Gen-
eral Assembly of Pennsylvania, March 21, 1947, embodying recommendations which re-
sulted in passage of the MVSFA, it was pointed out that the preponderance of con-
sumer complaints arose out of automobile sales. However, as a theoretical matter,
consumer instalment sales in larger amounts, as is the case with automobiles, ought
not to involve the same impelling necessity as in the case of installment sales in
the under $300 range, and to this extent the social consequences of overreaching
may not be as serious. See Hubachek, The Drift Toward a Consumer Credit Code,
16 U. CI. L. REv. 609, 612 (1949).
6. Based on estimates of consumer automobile paper outstanding in 1947 of 1.9
billion dollars, and other consumer goods paper of 2.1 billion dollars. 39 FgD. RE-
SIRvn BULL. 398 (April 1953). Based on current estimates the fraction would be
over one-third, see note 3 supra.
7. See Nugent and Henderson, supra note 2.
8. See Montgomery, The Pennsylvania Bailment Lease, 79 U. PA. L. Rcv. 920(1931). Under this form the lessor (seller) retains absolute ownership, and the
lessee (buyer) makes periodic payments for the use of the goods without gaining
legal or equitable rights of ownership until the final payment is made.
9. In other states instalment sales ordinarily take the form of a conditional sale.
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as the need for money.' 0 In addition, the instalment obligation is geared
to the periodic payment of wages, and the realities of over-extension may
easily be blurred while the inducement to obligate to the limit is enhanced.
The average person readily mistakes a rate of discount for a rate
of interest. In an instalment obligation it is usually a discount rate which
is stated. Because the amount of principal outstanding in an instalment
debt declines with each payment, the charge computed at the beginning on
the entire balance works out to an effective interest rate of almost double
the discount rate stated." It has often been found that the instalment
buyer is prevented from becoming informed as to the contents of the obli-
gation which he undertakes. 1 2 In a great many cases, contracts are signed
in blank. The more onerous provisions are hidden away in a maze of
fine print, and the buyer's rights are often not set out at all.13
While in most states consumer instalment sales are subject to the
Uniform Conditional Sales Act,14 Pennsylvania expressly omitted the
bailment lease form of contract in its enactment of the statute.1 5 In this
way the benefit of statutory safeguards otherwise readily available were
forestalled for Pennsylvania consumer instalment buyers.
The complexity of rate charges in instalment credit, combined with
the opportunity for subterfuge and overreaching in the execution and form
of instalment sale contracts, argues strongly for appropriate legislation
to protect the consumer instalment buyer.
10. See Hubachek, supra note 5, at 612. To this extent, the validity of the
often-voiced argument for not granting the shelter of usury laws to instalment
buyers of goods because they should not be considered driven by necessity is nullified.
Cf., General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Weinrich, 218 Mo. App. 68, 262 S.W. 425
(1924).
11. For example, if A borrowed $120 to be repaid in instalments of $10 per
month and was charged 6 percent interest, the charge would be computed on the
declining balance and would approximate the interest charge on a $60 non-instalment
loan none of which was repaid during the year. However, if the loan were dis-
counted at 6 percent the charge would be computed at the beginning of the period
on the entire balance of $120, and is almost doubled.
12. A vivid example of this appears in the recent case of Hogan v. Metropolitan
Food Plan, Inc., 140 LEGAL INTELLIGENCXR No. 23, p. 1, col. 1 (Phila. Munic. Ct.
Dec. 16, 1958), in which the court struck off a judgment entered upon a note for
$766, unknowingly signed by the plaintiffs, husband and wife, in connection with
the purchase of a freezer food plan. It was found that in view of the misleading
newspaper advertisement, the high pressure representations of defendant's salesman,
and the confusing ambiguity of the bailment lease forms, plaintiffs could not be
taken to have understood or be held to what they had signed.
13. See Berger, Usury in Instalment Sales, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 148, 151(1935); Nugent and Henderson, supra note 2; Summary Report of the Joint State
Government Commission to the General Assembly of Pennsylvania, pp. 14-20, March
21, 1947.
14. The sections of the UNIVORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT helpful to a consumer
instalment buyer are those on Repossession (16 and 17), Redemption (18), Resale(19-23), and Buyers Remedies (25).
15. Conditional Sales Act of May 12, 1925, P.L. 603, No. 325 (repealed) as
construed by Stern & Co. v. Paul, 96 Pa. Super. 112 (1929) ; 3 Tnmp. L.Q. 451
(1929). The only legislation affecting the rights of the lessee under a bailment
lease was the Act of June 28, 1947, P.L. 1141, No. 478 (repealed), in which pro-
vision was made for the allocation of payments where goods purchased on a prior
bailment lease are made security for goods purchased on a later bailment lease
(an add-on provision).
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II.
USURY STATUTES.
In general, usury statutes as construed by courts have been of no
avail for the protection of a consumer instalment buyer. 16 It has usually
been held that the higher total price set by a seller when payment is to be
made in instalments (time-sale price) must be considered as the actual
price of the goods sold in that way.' 7 It follows that a seller is free to set
such a price without turning the transaction into a loan or the forbearance
on a debt. Presumably, this view is based on the theory that the value
of such goods is enhanced to a buyer who cannot afford to pay cash, but
who nevertheless desires immediate possession.' However, where there
is a recognized cash price (where payment is immediate as opposed to the
time-sale price) for the same goods, as is ordinarily the case, the resem-
blance of the time-sale to the forbearance of an existing debt becomes
marked. Enter a third party finance company, regularly in the business
of making loans, to relieve the seller of the burden of extending the credit
by purchasing the instalment sale contract, and the similarity to the situ-
ation in which the buyer borrows from a third person to pay the seller
in cash is even more striking. In either case, the posture of the transaction
is at least somewhat equivocal.' 9 Had the courts been so disposed, they
could have viewed the instalment sale as essentially within the compass
of the usury statute20 without undue effort. In support of such an appli-
cation, there has been presented convincing historical justification.2 ' The
attitude of the courts in refusing to so view the transaction has been more
often justified than explained, being attributed to the doctrine of freedom
of contract, judicial abhorrence of a forfeiture, and recognition of the
inadequacy of the statutory interest rate when applied to instalment credit
sales.22
16. See e.g., Commercial Credit Co. v. Tarwater, 215 Ala. 123, 110 So. 39 (1926);
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Weinrich, 218 Mo. App. 68, 262 S.W. 425
(1924) ; Melnicoff v. Huber Inv. Co., 12 Pa. D. & C. 405 (Phila. Munic. Ct. 1929) ;
see Annot., 143 A.L.R. 238 (1943). Usury is generally defined as the charging of
excessive interest on a loan of money or the forbearance of a debt.
17. Courts have been more ready to find a time price bona fide when it has
been stated only as a total price rather than the sum arrived at by adding various
charges to the cash price. See Daniel v. First Nat'l Bank, 227 F.2d 353 (5th Cir.
1955).
18. A countervailing consideration is that only by inducing people to accept an
extension of credit can a seller hope to expand sales and thereby profits. The trans-
action is not entirely one-sided.
19. This is somewhat evident in the willingness of courts to hold the form of
the transaction merely a disguise for usury in order to avoid unjust results. See
Nazarian v. Lincoln Fin. Corp., 77 R.I. 497, 78 A.2d 7 (1951).
20. While Pennsylvania's statute, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 4 (1954), speaks
only in terms of "a rate of interest for the loan or use of money," and literally
does not include a time-sale of goods, many statutes speak also in terms of the
"forbearance of a debt" under which an instalment sale transaction could literally
be included.
21. See Berger, supra note 13.
22. See Berger, supra note 13, at 149.
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So apparently determined in this conventional view of the usury
statute was the Utah court, that when legislation was passed specifically
prescribing a maximum rate of interest on a contract for the purchase of
goods, it held that only where the finance charge was stated separately
did the sale come within the statute.23 What can be said for this tradi-
tional viewpoint is that it left undampened the spectacular expansion of
instalment credit which has in part accounted for present levels of economic
prosperity. 24
Recently, some courts have begun to depart from the prevailing no-
tion and for the first time have brought bona fide credit sales within
the ambit of the usury proscription. 25 In view of the generally recognized
need for more effective protection for the consumer instalment buyer, and
after a more realistic look anew at the time-honored instalment sale, it
can be expected that more courts will adopt this growing minority view.
As a practical matter, however, the problem has been obviated in a grow-
ing number of jurisdictions by the enactment of comprehensive legislation
regulating all aspects of the consumer instalment sale.
III.
SPECIFIC STATUTORY REGULATION.
Had usury statutes been applied generally to instalment sales to
determine the maximum allowable finance charge, they would have been
in aid of only one phase of the installment sale transaction in need of
regulation. Present day comprehensive legislation is on a much more am-
bitious scale. To date, twenty-eight states have enacted statutes designed to
regulate the more important aspects of the entire instalment sale trans-
action.26 Much of this recent legislation contains rate-fixing provisions,
and to this extent fills the gap created by the judicial refusal to apply
usury statutes .2  However, the more important features of such legislation
are in the requirements for full disclosure and fair methods of dealing.28
23. Mathias v. Holland Furnace Co., 109 Utah 449, 166 P.2d 518 (1946).
24. See Berger, supra note 13, at 172. In this regard, an interesting Note in
48 YALE L.J. 1102 (1939), points out that were usury laws to be held applicable to
instalment sales, there is no possible legal reason which would prevent a like appli-
cation of the small loan statutes which allow for an annual return greatly in excess
of the usury rate.
25. Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d 973
(1952); Hillman's v. Elm 'N Al's, 345 Mich. 644, 77 N.W.2d 96 (1956); Seebold
v. Eustermann, 216 Minn. 566, 13 N.W.2d 739 (1944); McNish v. Grand Island
Fin. Co., 164 Neb. 543, 83 N.W.2d 13 (1957) ; G.F.C. Corp. v. Williams, 231 S.W.2d
218 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950). See Note, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1143, 1144 (1958).
26. For an extensive discussion of and citation to all such statutes see Hogan,
Survey of State Retail Instalment Sales Legislation, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 38 (1958).
27. Id. at 47.
28. There is another type of consumer credit regulation ordinarily imposed on
the federal level, such as was embodied in the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation
W, in which the amount of down-payment and length of time to repay is regulated
for the purpose of affecting the total amount of consumer credit outstanding in an
effort to control inflation.
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A typical provision is the requirement that the contract be in writing
and be signed by both parties after all blanks have been filled in. An exact
copy must be given to the buyer without charge at the time of execution.
The contract must contain a bold notice informing the buyer of certain
of his more important rights. There must appear a breakdown of the
total amount obligated, showing, inter alia, the cash price, down-payment,
finance charge, cost of insurance and official fees. There must be included
a statement of the buyer's right of prepayment with a proportionate rebate
of the finance charge, his rights respecting redemption or reinstatement
in the event of default and repossession, and his liabilities with regard to
default charges and a deficiency judgment. 29 These requirements are de-
signed to make buyer more fully aware of his rights and obligations under
the contract.
Statutes generally prohibit acceleration before default, waiver of de-
fenses or legal remedies by the buyer, the use of negotiable notes, con-
fession of judgment clauses, assignment of wages, 30 add-ons, 31 and balloon
payments.3 2 The buyer is usually given the right to purchase his own in-
surance and to obtain a complete statement of his outstanding obligation
upon request.33 Strangely enough, many of the statutes do not provide
for the regulation of repossession and resale, and this has been criticized.34
Except for the fact that it is applicable only to automobile installment
sales financing, the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act should
be' ranked as comprehensive as any statute in the field. Its licensing pro-
visions covering sellers, finance companies, and collector-repossessors are
designed to insure an adequate measure of administrative supervision and
control over all commercial participants in the instalment sale transaction.3 5
On the other hand, as a prototype for further controls in Pennsylvania,
the coverage of the act may well be thought too broad when projected to
instalment sales beyond those in auto financing, since it includes both
consumer and commercial transactions.3 6
29. See Hogan, supra note 26. Compare MVSFA §§ 613A-4, 614B-E, having
substantially similar provisions.
30. The MVSFA is one of the few such statutes which makes no express pro-
hibition of the assignment of wages in connection with an instalment sale, and this
is because in Pennsylvania the assignment of wages is prohibited generally, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, § 271 (1952).
31. The add-on is a device providing that future purchases will be secured by
the goods under the present purchase. In this way a default on a later purchase
will authorize a repossession of all goods purchased even though earlier purchases
may have been paid for completely.
32. A balloon payment is the use of a disproportionately large last payment
in order to increase the chance of a default when all but the last payment has
been met.
33. See generally Hogan, supra note 26.
34. See Hogan, supra note 26, at 61 & n. 119.
35. MVSFA §§ 604-612.
36. See Hogan, supra note 26, at 72, where it is pointed out that the concern for
the consumer dealing with the professional seller and finance company should be
greater than for the commercial buyer who is also a professional; and that regula-
tion of sales between businessmen may impede normal commercial practices.
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IV.
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE.
In its early drafts, the Uniform Commercial Code in Section 9-205
contained disclosure provisions which in the case of a security interest in
consumer goods would have required that certain information be made
available to the consumer-debtor at or before the time he entered into
the security agreement.37 Attacked as an example of misplaced reformist
zeal, it failed of final adoption. 38 This is not to say that the Code has not
had an ameliorating effect on the form of contract in consumer trans-
actions. Most importantly, section 9-206(1), in the case of a consumer,
makes an agreement not to assert defenses arising out of the sale un-
enforceable by an assignee of the contract.3 9 It also states two situations
in which such defenses may be urged against a holder in due course of
a negotiable instrument signed as part of the same transaction. 40 How-
ever, it leaves the buyer unprotected at the hands of a finance company
in the position of a holder in due course when it brings an action on
the note and levies upon any property of the buyer other than the goods
which gave rise to the note. 41 The 1957 Official Text of the Uniform
Commercial Code, presently being considered for adoption in Pennsyl-
vania, abolishes these provisions specially favoring the consumer, save
as they should be established by statute or decision.
4 2
Presently, the Code in terms neither validates nor prohibits the add-
on; the add-on is presumably left intact as it was permitted before the
Code. However, under prior Pennsylvania law provision was made for
the allocation of payments where subsequent purchases were made under
37. Spring 1950 draft. A breakdown of items constituting the total time price
was provided for: the cash price, the time-price differential (finance charge), the
amount of any down payment, and an estimate of the amount charged for insurance
had to be stated as separate items. Penalties were provided for failure to comply,
viz., loss of the time-price differential (finance charge) when a complying form of
contract be only inadvertently filled out incorrectly, and loss of the finance charge
plus loss of the security interest in other cases.
38. See Kripke, The "Secured Transactions" Provisions of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 35 VA. L. Rpv. 577, 613 (1949).
39. This codifies the better case law view in which attempts to impart negoti-
ability to chattel paper by use of waiver of defense clauses have been held ineffective.
See Note, 57 YALt L.J. 1414 (1948), and cases cited therein.
40. That is, where the holder seeks to enforce the security interest by (1) pro-
ceeding under the agreement, or (2) by attaching or levying upon the collateral
in an action upon the instrument.
41. In this situation it has sometimes been held that a finance company dealing
regularly with a particular seller is on notice of recurring defenses so as to be pre-
cluded from obtaining the status of a holder in due course. See Commercial Credit
Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 1940); Commercial Credit Corp. v.
Orange County Machine Works, 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950).
42. This would appear to be in recognition of the growing policy to regulate
consumer secured transactions separately under specific comprehensive legislation.
The MVSFA § 632, unqualifiedly prohibits the waiver of defenses arising out of
the transaction, and also the execution of any note which when separately negotiated
would cut off such defenses.
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an add-on clause.43 The Code specifically repealed the acts embodying
this buyer safeguard, but set up none of its own, and hence, there is no
apparent restraint on the use of the add-on. The Code in the proposed
revision would appear to affirmatively allow free use of the add-on by
providing that "obligations covered by a security agreement may include
future advances or other value whether or not the advances or value are
given pursuant to commitment." 44 (Emphasis added.)
An acceleration clause conditioned upon a seller deeming himself
insecure is allowed by the Code, limited only by the requirement that it
be exercised in good faith.45 It can be doubted whether this gives an
instalment buyer any greater protection against the oppressive use of such
a term than that which he would have had under the view requiring such
clauses to be exercised reasonably.46
It is in the area of remedies on default that the Code has gone
furthest to better the condition of an instalment buyer. It nevertheless
falls short of the safeguards provided for auto purchasers by the Motor
Vehicle Sales Finance Act in the same area. The Code allows repossession
immediately upon default and by other than legal process where it can
be effected without a breach of the peace. 47 The seller is allowed all rea-
sonable expenses of retaking and disposition. 48  The Code requires no
specific waiting period before disposition beyond that of giving a debtor
reasonable notice of the time and place of resale, which may be either
public or private and in any manner commercially reasonable. 49  In the
case of consumer goods in which sixty percent of the cash price has been
paid, disposition within ninety days is mandatory. 50 For failure to comply
with this requirement a buyer may recover in conversion or for any loss
sustained by such failure plus the finance charge and ten percent of the
cash price. 51 The buyer may renounce these rights only by signing a
43. Act of June 28, 1947, P.L. 1141, No. 478 (repealed) (bailment leases);
Act of June 28, 1947, P.L. 1140, No. 477 (repealed) (conditional sales) ; Act of
June 1, 1945, P.L. 1358, No. 434 (repealed) (chattel mortgages). See note 31 supra.
44. Uniform Commercial Code § 9-204(5) (1957 Official Text). This would
abandon the consumer to the uninhibited use of the add-on, which in the past has
proved itself a favorite device of the unethical seller. The MVSFA § 614C limits
the use of the add-on device by requiring the instalment sale contract to specify any
additional security to be taken for the buyer's obligation.
45. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 1-208 (1954). The burden of establishing lack
of good faith is on the buyer.
46. See RtSTATEMPNT, CONTRACTS § 265 (1932). The MVSFA § 615B prohibits
acceleration except upon default or where the motor vehicle is being used for illegal
purposes.
47. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-503 (1954).
48. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-504(2) (1954). The MVSFA § 623, allows
expenses incurred only when repossession is effected after fifteen days have elapsed
from the time of default. Detailed provision is made requiring that these costs be
substantiated. In any event, the Department of Banking is given authority to review
and adjust such expenses should they appear fictitious, unnecessary, unreasonable
or exorbitant.
49. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-504(2) (1954).
50. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-505(1) (1954).
51. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-507(1) (1954).
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written waiver after default.5 2 Where less than sixty percent of the
cash price has been paid, the seller may elect to retain the goods in satis-
faction of the obligation, unless within thirty days the buyer objects where-
upon disposition is mandatory. 53 A buyer may redeem the goods prior
to the time the secured party disposes of them by tendering payment of
all sums due under the agreement plus the expenses allowed the seller.54
V.
CONCLUSION.
Even after a brief look at the protections afforded a consumer in-
stalment buyer coming under the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act, and
those accorded other consumers by existing statutory controls, the dis-
parity is evident. Should the Uniform Commercial Code in effect in
Pennsylvania be amended in accordance with the changes53 proposed in
the 1957 Official Text, the disparity will increase. The changes working
such a result appear to have been made in recognition of the increase and
enlargement, by states, of specific legislation dealing with the consumer
problem in secured transactions. Such separate treatment is more than
justified; it is a necessary concomitant of the large expansion in consumer
instalment credit if the interests of the general buying public are to be
served. The protection which would be afforded by legislation comparable
to the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act should be extended to all con-
sumer instalment buyers without further delay.
John J. Cleary
ZONING-PRINCIPLE OF RETROACTIVITY AND AMORTIZATION OF THE
NON-CONFORMING UsE-A PARADOX IN PROPERTY LAW.
Amortization is a term more germane to accounting than to zoning.
The word has been introduced into zoning law to describe a way of elim-
inating non-conforming uses. In the beginning, zoning legislation was
confronted with judicial resistance when it tried to remove at once prop-
erty uses which did not conform to the zoning classification of the area.
52. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-505(1) (1954). Under the MVSFA § 632, the
buyer cannot waive his rights.
53. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-505(2) (1954).
54. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-506 (1954). Under the MVSFA §§ 625-626,
the buyer is given fifteen days after repossession to redeem. If this is not done all
claim to the vehicle is forfeited. The buyer may be proceeded against for a deficiencyjudgment after a public or private resale. The buyer has the right to have the
reasonable value at the time of the resale determined in the proceeding to rcover
the deficiency, but the actual resale price is prima facie evidence of the reasonable value.
55. See text at notes 42, 44 supra.
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The basis of the judicial objection was constitutional; procedurally, the
constitution was violated because the law operated retroactively; sub-
stantively, the constitution was violated because the owner's property was
confiscated without compensation.
Amortization is directed toward these constitutional problems. It
provides a period of time for the property owner to recover his invest-
ment in the property, and then demands conformity. There are two
basic steps in the amortization method. Step one is to determine the
economic life in years of the property use to be amortized. Step two is
to pass a zoning ordinance which prohibits continuance of the non-
conforming use after its economic life as previously determined expires.
The reasoning is clear: after the economic life has passed, any property
which may remain cannot be attributed to the period antedating the zon-
ing ordinance, but must be attributed to the period of time during which
amortization was in progress. Consequently, as to the property which
remains, there is no retroactivity, and the due process requirements of
notice and hearing have been satisfied. Furthermore, when amortization
is complete, the original zoning ordinance cannot be said to confiscate any
property because that property which existed at the time of the original
ordinance no longer exists.
Amortization is no more than a legal trend at the present time; but
this Comment is designed to show that this trend, in modified form, may
shortly become the most widely accepted solution to the problem of non-
conforming uses.
I.
ZONING LAW IN GENERAL.
Zoning is a legislative activity in every major city of the nation. Its
purpose is to stabilize and preserve property values through governmental
controls.' Zoning respects the traditional concepts of private property
which have been inherited from the common law and from western phi-
losophy in general, 2 but it recognizes no absolutes. The zoning power
is a political authority established to benefit the community, and its role
is to foster community interests as they arise, without reference to his-
1. "We believe it may be said that zoning serves a two-fold purpose, - one, to
preserve the true character of a neighborhood by excluding new uses and structures
prejudicial to the restricted purposes of the area, and gradual elimination of such
existing structures and uses; and second, to protect an owner's property or existing
residence, business, or industry from impairment which would result from enforced
accommodation to new restrictions." 1 YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE, § 11
(2d ed. 1953).
2. Compare the philosophical concepts of property in Locke, Concerning Civil
Government, in ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS FROM BACON TO MILL 413 (Modern Library
ed. 1939) ; Belloc, On the Restoration of Property, in THE WISDOM OF CATHOLICISM
840 (Pegis ed. 1949) ; Hegel, Philosophy of Right and Law, in PHILOSOPHY OF HEGEL
242 (Modern Library ed. 1954), with the common law concept of property as stated
in Willcox v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 357 Pa. 581, 55 A.2d 521 (1947) ; and Spann
v. Dallas, 111 Tex. 350, 235 S.W. 513 (1921).
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torical notions concerning private interests, insofar as the latter might
constrain the accomplishment of zoning purposes.
Zoning is legally justified as an exercise of the police power, 3 although
exact limits on the scope of the police power have never been formulated.
All property is subject to such police power regulations as will better
promote the health, safety, and general welfare of the community. 4 Such
regulations can preserve the suitability of residential property in order
to maintain its tax value to the state, its desirability to productive citizens,
its supplementary assistance in preserving the harmony of the home, and
the general contentment and peacefulness of the populace.5 The police
power may likewise regulate the location and use of property in order to
economize in providing municipal services or to protect the municipality
from safety hazards.6
The zoning power is thus ill-defined except in the most general terms,
which generalities by themselves provide no adequate standard for re-
straint in exercising it or for judging the validity of its exercise. In view
of this fluidity, it is not inaccurate to declare that the primary restraint
in the exercise of zoning power is the reasonableness and discreet judg-
ment of those men charged with its administration, rather than an in-
flexible interdiction of law. Consequently, the judicial power has been
compelled to supply an independent and separate judgment of zoning
regulations in order to infuse zoning administrators with a reasonable
regard for historically approved private rights. 7
3. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) ; Sinclair Ref.
Co. v. Chicago, 178 F.2d 214 (7th Cir. 1949); Reynolds v. Barrett, 12 Cal. 2d 244,
83 P.2d 29 (1938) ; Presiding Bishop v. City of Poterville, 90 Cal. App. 2d 656, 203
P.2d 823, appeal dismissed, 338 U.S. 805 (1950) ; State v. Russell, 162 Ohio St. 281,
123 N.E.2d 261 (1954) ; Appeal of Lieb, 179 Pa. Super. 318, 116 A.2d 860 (1955).
4. Barbier v. Connelly, 113 U.S. 27 (1884); Jefferson County v. Birmingham,
256 Ala. 436, 55 So. 2d 196 (1951) ; Berkholder v. City of Sterling, 381 Ill. 564,
46 N.E.2d 45 (1943) ; Selingman v. Belknap, 288 Ky. 133, 155 S.W.2d 735 (1941);
Shepherd v. City of Skaneateles, 300 N.Y. 115, 89 N.E.2d 619 (1949).
5. Women's Soc'y v. Kansas City, 58 F.2d 593 (8th Cir. 1932). "... [W]ith
the crowding of population in the cities, there is an active insistence upon the estab-
lishment of residential districts from which annoying occupations and buildings, un-
desirable to the community, are excluded. Without minimizing its force, it is well
to note that the police power, which permits the creation of exclusive residential
districts, may enforce, when invoked, better housing conditions in localities where
they are unwholesome . . . ." State ex rel Beery v. Houghton, 164 Minn. 146, 148,
204 N.W. 569, 570 (1925).
6. "The right of the appellee city to pass the ordinance in question . . . may also
be predicated upon the power of the city to protect its inhabitants from fire hazard."
Marblehead Land Co. v. Los Angeles, 47 F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1931).
7. This judicial review of zoning legislation accords with basic approval of
judicial review for all legislative enactments. "The Utility of an external power
restraining the legislative judgment is not to be measured by counting the occasions
of its exercise. The great ideals of liberty and equality are preserved against the
assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small en-
croachments, the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with general
principles, by enshrining them in constitutions, and consecrating to the task of their
protection a body of defenders. By conscious or unconscious influence, the presence
of this restraining power, aloof in the background, but nonetheless always in reserve,
tends to stablize and rationalize the legislative judgment, to infuse it with the glow
of principle, to hold the standard aloft and visible for those who must run the race
and keep the faith." CARDOZO, Tmii NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 92-93 (1922).
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Problems in zoning law cannot be understood without some appre-
ciation of the underlying struggle between the administrators and the
courts. Administration of zoning laws is accomplished on a local level.
The state legislature passes an enabling act which delegates the zoning
power to counties, cities, and other political subdivisions. These, in turn,
further delegate the power to zoning boards which exist in each zoning
district.8 In municipalities, the city council, or more commonly, a local
commission designated by city council, usually suggests zoning legisla-
tion. However one may feel about the relative merits of the administra-
tive process, it is indisputably clear that this extensive delegation of zon-
ing power to local bodies is hardly calculated to achieve independence
from political abuses. Local bodies are all too frequently influenced by
polical considerations, and the powers given local bodies are often ex-
ercised in accordance with those considerations. The courts know that
these administrative deficiencies permeate all zoning laws; and the lack
of judicial confidence in the administration of zoning laws is a matter
of record. 9 With this judicial-administrative struggle as a background,
it is easier to understand the particular zoning problem here involved,
because the courts are reluctant to entrust weak administrative bodies
with any substantial control over private property.
II.
THE NON-CONFORMING USE.
A non-conforming use is simply a use of property within the zoning
district which does not comply with the general zoning law for that dis-
trict. Non-conforming uses are specially created in two ways. First of
all, a non-conforming use may be created by the zoning board itself when
it grants a variance' 0 from the requirements of the local zoning law. This
is an administratively sanctioned non-conforming use. These non-con-
forming uses present no problem because they can be created for as long
or as short a time as the zoning board permits, and in any event, depend
upon the board for continued existence."
8. BASSETT, ZONING, c. 2 (2d ed. 1940).
9. The Supreme Court of Illinois, over a ten year period, ruled in thirteen cases
that the administration was arbitrary and unreasonable. La Grange v. Leitch, 377 Ill.
99, 35 N.E.2d 346, (1941) ; Harman v. Peoria, 373 Ill. 594, 27 N.E.2d 525 (1940) ;
Taylor v. Glencoe, 372 Ill. 507, 25 N.E.2d 62 (1940) ; Catholic Bishop v. Kingery,
371 Ill. 257, 20 N.E.2d 583 (1939) ; Johnson v. Villa Park, 370 Ill. 272, 18 N.E.2d
887 (1938); People ex rel Kirby v. Rockford, 363 Ill. 531, 2 N.E.2d 842 (1936);
Reschke v. Winnetka, 363 II. 478, 2 N.E.2d 718 (1936) ; Ehrlich v. Wilmette, 361
Il1. 213 197 N.E. 567 (1935) ; State Bank v. Wilmette, 358 Ill. 311, 193 N.E. 131
(1934) ; Merrill v. Wheaton, 356 Ill. 427, 190 N.E. 918 (1934) ; People ex rel Lind
v. Rockford, 354 Ill. 377, 188 N.E. 446 (1933) ; Tews v. Woolhiser, 352 Ill. 212, 185
N.E. 827 (1933); Forbes v. Hubbard, 348 Ill. 166, 180 N.E. 767 (1932). See also
Comment, 30 IND. L.J. 521 (1955).
10. Variances are granted by the board of zoning appeals. Where no such ap-
pellate procedure exists, spot zoning accomplishes the same result. BAssETT, ZONING
122 (2d ed. 1940).
11. Neddo v. Schrade, 270 N.Y. 97, 200 N.E. 657 (1936).
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Secondly, however, non-conforming uses may exist because the use
of the property antedates the zoning law. In this case, the use does not
depend upon the zoning board for its continued existence, but rather
depends upon a property right (ownership) vested in the owner. 1 2 This
property right transcends the political power of the zoning board unless
that power can be given retroactive effect. But the courts have abhorred
retroactivity and retroactive laws since the foundation of the present political
structure.13 Consequently, this type of non-conforming use has been ju-
dicially sanctioned. 1 4 Thus there obtains a paradox in our property law.
One branch of government, the legislature, creates a zoning authority to
accomplish conformity in property uses; subsequently another branch of
the same government, the judiciary, prohibits the application of this au-
thority to the great bulk of non-conforming uses. If property rights are
to be determined by historical customs and legal traditions, then it seems
as if the courts must prevail. On the other hand, if social utility is the
fountainhead of property rights, then it seems as if these non-conforming
uses ought to yield to the changing social needs of the times as they are
expressed through enactment of zoning laws.
The purpose of this Comment is to trace the efforts of the zoning
legislators over the past years in respect to eliminating the non-conforming
use; also, to show the judicial hurdles which have been placed in the
path of these efforts; and finally, to present a sampled analysis of the
current law of non-conforming uses which is being reinvigorated by the
widespread adoption of the principle of amortization.'5
III.
REGULATING THE NON-CONFORMING USE.
A.
Initial Efforts.
The decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.'6 merely held
that a comprehensive zoning ordinance which restricted future uses of
12. "It would seem therefore that the right to use one's property for the conduct
of a lawful business not inimical to the health, safety, or morals of the community
becomes entitled to constitutional protection against otherwise valid legislative restric-
tions as to locality, or, in other words, becomes vested within the full meaning of
that term, when, prior to the enactment of such provisions, the owner has in good
faith substantially entered upon the performance of the series of acts necessary to
the accomplishment of the ends desired." Darlington v. City of Frankfort, 282 Ky.
778, 783, 140 S.W.2d 392, 396 (1940).
13. WAD8, RtROACTIVE LAWS, § 1 (1880).
14. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Sprague, 4 F. Supp. 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1933) ; Amereihn
v. Kotras, 194 Md. 591, 71 A.2d 865 (1950); Landay v. MacWilliams, 173 Md. 460,
196 At. 293 (1938); Village of Millneck v. Nolan, 233 App. Div. 248, 251 N.Y.
Supp. 533 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 259 N.Y. 596, 182 N.E. 196 (1931); Appeal of Pierce,
384 Pa. 100, 119 A.2d 506 (1956) ; Houston v. Lurie, 148 Tex. 391, 224 S.W.2d 871
(1949).
15. Thus far, amortization has been employed only in a prohibitory scheme, i.e.,
that the use is forbidden and must be removed after the designated term.
16. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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vacant land was constitutional. Thus the case is no authority for abol-
ishing, by means of zoning legislation, a present use of land which does
not conform to the zoning ordinance.
There are no United States Supreme Court decisions promulgating
the extent to which zoning legislation may abolish non-conforming uses.
There is some indication, however, from the Dema Realty' 7 case that the
Court would permit zoning laws to eliminate non-conforming uses on
an extended theory of nuisance. Nevertheless nuisance law is of little
value here, since a non-conforming use is obviously not per se a nuisance.' 8
Nuisances are uses of property which deleteriously affect the physical well-
being of adjacent property. The introduction of nuisance law serves only
to confuse the real issue and avoids, rather than solves, the problem.' 9
Non-conforming uses may be nuisances,-there can be no doubt of that.
If they are nuisances, then they can be eliminated by injunction.20 But
it is equally certain that not every non-conforming use is a nuisance.
Non-conformity alone cannot affect the physical well-being of adjacent
property, and thus non-conformity alone is not ipso facto a ground for
a nuisance action, unless the law of nuisance be enlarged far beyond its
common law boundaries. To so enlarge nuisance law is to become mes-
merized with labels in order to beg the true question which lies beneath,
namely, whether zoning law can constitutionally eliminate non-conforming
uses to accomplish zoning purposes.
In the face of this undetermined federal constitutionality, methods
were adopted which would indirectly obtain the desired results without
risking a serious constitutional attack. Thus, zoning legislation began
its regulation of non-conforming uses by providing strict technical quali-
fications in defining the permissible non-conforming use. Uses illegal for
reasons other than zoning were eliminated at once, no matter how trivial
or minor the offense.2 ' Irregular uses of land were declared too ephemeral
to be allowed to obstruct the conformity of zoned areas. Such uses did
not achieve a sufficient degree of permanence to be classified as pre-
existing.2 2 Certain decisions in the State of New York, collected in the
case of People v. Miller,23 implied that a minimum financial value was
required before a legally cognizable use existed.
Nice questions arose as to when a use was prior to a zoning ordinance.
If an owner merely had a building permit, but no outstanding contracts
17. See State ex rel Dema Realty Co. v. Jacoby, 168 La. 752, 123 So. 314 (1929) ;State ex rel Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613, cert. denied,
280 U.S. 556 (1929).
18. See Noel, Retroactive Zoning and Nuisances, 41 CoIum. L. Rzv. 457 (1941).
19. BASSETT, ZONING 93 (2d ed. 1940).
20. Mazeika v. American Oil Co., 383 Pa. 191, 118 A.2d 142 (1955).
21. Acker v. Baldwin, 18 Cal. 2d 341, 115 P.2d 455 (1941).
22. Durning v. Summerfield, 314 Ky. 318, 235 S.W.2d 761 (1951) ; Baltimore
v. Shapiro, 187 Md. 623, 51 A.2d 273 (1947).
23. 304 N.Y. 105, 106 N.E.2d 34 (1952).
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and no actual construction on his land at the time a zoning ordinance was
passed, there was no use prior to the ordinance.2 4 Predicting the degree
to which a party had to rely on the building permit before establishing
a use became impossible as each case began to turn on the quantum of
proof.
Qualifying as a non-conforming use did not insulate the landowner
from the effects of zoning law. To the contrary, it could be said that
qualification was the beginning of his troubles. The non-conforming busi-
ness was not permitted to expand its operations nor enlarge its plant;
alterations were prohibited even if they were done within the existing
structure; repairs were permitted, but they could not amount to recon-
struction. 25 Abandonment was fatal to ownership even under old prop-
erty law, but under zoning law, distinctions between abandonment and
mere discontinuance grew vague and uncertain ;26 parties were burdened
with proving that discontinuances were not abandonments, and some
zoning ordinances provided that after so short a period as sixty days, a
discontinuance raised a conclusive presumption of abandonment. 27 These
measures were successful to a greater or lesser degree depending upon
court interpretation of the various ordinances, but the mode of attack was
widely employed. 28 There were other methods of elimination, not so
widely employed, but nonetheless efficient under special circumstances. For
example: when a non-conforming structure was accidently destroyed, the
owner could not rebuild it ;29 when a non-conforming user of property
attempted to sell it and the use that it was put to, the buyer could not
acquire the non-conforming use. 30 These latter type ordinances were not
judicially approved. Finally, it has been observed that an ordinance deny-
ing public services such as water and sewerage to a non-conforming user
of property would probably be prima facie unconstitutional. 3 1
24. *See Taub v. McElliott, 246 App. Div. 729, (2d Dep't 1935) (memorandum
decision) ; Atlas v. Dick, 192 Misc. 843, 81 N.Y.S.2d 126 (Sup. Ct. 1948) ; Appeal
of Supply & Co., 202 N.C. 496, 163 S.E. 462 (1932); McCurley v. El Reno, .138
Okla. 92, 280 Pac. 467 (1929).
25. See Thayer v. Board of Appeal, 114 Conn. 15, 157 Ati. 273 (1931); Price
v. Ackman, 345 11. App. 1, 102 N.E.2d 194 (1951); Colati v. Juniot, 186 Md. 652,
47 A.2d 613 (1946); Cole v. Battle Creek, 298 Mich. 98, 298 N.W. 466 (1941)
DeVito v. Pearsall, 115 N.J. 323, 180 Atl. 202 (1935).
26. See Note, 6 MIAMI L.Q. 135 (1951).
27. See Berkman v. Board of Zoning Appeal, 135 Conn. 393, 64 A.2d 875 (1949).
28. See Wilson v. Edgar, 64 Cal. App. 654, 222 Pac. 623 (1923); Besezdes v.
Board of Appeal, 116 Colo. 123, 178 P.2d 950 (1947) ; Franmore Realty v. LeBoeuf,
201 Misc. 220, 104 N.Y.S.2d 247 (Sup. Ct. 1951), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 795, 109
N.Y.S.2d 525 (2d Dep't 1952) ; Binghamton v. Cartell, 275 App. Div. 457, 90 N.Y.S.2d
556 (3d Dep't 1949) ; Schaetz v. Manders, 206 Wisc. 121, 238 N.W. 835 (1931).
29. Koeber v. Bedell, 254 App. Div. 584, 3 N.Y.S.2d 108 (2d Dep't 1938);
Navin v. Early, 56 N.Y.S.2d 246 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
30. O'Connor v. Moscow, 69 Idaho 37, 202 P.2d 401 (1949) (such a statute
was a denial of due process of law and thus unconstitutional). Compare Schneider
v. City of Ottawa, 402 Ill. 536, 84 N.E.2d 428 (1949); Killian v. Brith Sholom
Congregation, 154 S.W.2d 387 (Mo. 1941).
31. Willis, The Elimination of Non-conforming Uses, 1951 Wis. L. REv. 685,
citing an opinion of the Wisconsin Attorney General, 20 Oss. Wis. ATT'Y GVN. 751
(1931).
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B.
Amortizing the Non-conforming Use.
Despite high hopes for the successful elimination of non-conforming
uses by the methods described above,3 2 it is now generally conceded that
they did not accomplish any satisfactory progress toward conformity. Like
the phoenix, non-conforming uses seemed to rise from the dust of battle
stronger than ever. Some method to assure their ultimate removal had
to be devised.
The hope of zoning legislators is amortization. It is claimed that
amortization solves the problem of retroactivity imposed by the federal
and most state constitutions. The method is defended as follows:
"Amortization of the non-conforming use is fair. The useful life
of the building or use to which the premises are devoted is deter-
mined, and the owner has that length of time to conform. The loss
he suffers, if any, is spread out over a period of years and he further
enjoys a monopolistic position by virtue of the zoning ordinance so
long as he remains. Amortization will eventually eliminate non-
conforming uses." 33
The prediction embodied in the last sentence of the above statement
has not yet come true. If it is to come true, the principle of amortization
must become more generally accepted than it is now. The present con-
troversy over amortization has deprived it of its effectiveness as a tool.
The following collation of the laws of certain states demonstrates this
proposition. The states are categorized in accordance with the jurispru-
dential tendencies which their laws reflect. States which give paramount
importance to the social interests of zoning are categorized as progressive;
those which seek to reach a compromise between social interests and
private interests, as moderately progressive;. and those which give para-
mount importance to private interests, as conservative. This classification
is somewhat arbitrary, but this merely parallels the underlying diversity
of approach which the state legislatures and courts have taken.
1. Progressive States.
California is perhaps a leader in accepting the doctrine of amortization
of non-conforming uses.3 4 In 1954, in the celebrated case of City of Los
Angeles v. Gage,35 it was decided that amortizing non-conforming uses
32. See METZENBAUM, THE LAW OF ZONING, § 288 (1st ed. 1930).
33. Comment, 35 VA. L. Rtv. 348 (1949).
34. CAL. Gov'r COD ANN. § 65800 (West 1955).
35. 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (1954).
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as part of an integrated plan to zone the entire metropolitan area was
constitutional. The court repeated almost verbatim the defense of amor-
tization quoted above. 36 The case was well received in legal circles.37
Florida reached the conclusion that non-conforming uses could be
terminated under the general zoning power delegated through the enabling
statute. This is clearly indicated in the cases of West Palm Beach v.
Roddy Co.,8 8 Miami Beach v. First Trust Co.,8 9 and Standard Oil Co. v.
Tallahassee.4 0 The last case is radical and merits attention. The court
did not feel it was necessary to connect the time limit on the use of the
property with its economic life. Technically, the case does not involve
amortization because such a connection is the very heart of that method.
It would seem therefore that amortization would be a fortiori a proper
method.
New York approved amortization of non-conforming uses in the
recent case of Harbison v. City of Buffalo.4 1 A vigorous dissent in this
four to three decision emphasized that the courts have always protected
the vested property rights of a prior non-conforming user, and that retro-
activity is not overcome by amortization. 42
The Texas statutes neither permit nor prohibit continuation of non-
conforming uses.48 The decisions in Corpus Christi v. Allen44 and Car-
ruthers v. Board of Adjustment,45 make it quite clear that the power to
zone imports the power to terminate prior non-conforming uses through
amortization.
2. Moderate Progressive States.
Illinois specifically provided for elimination of non-conforming uses
by the amortization method in its enabling statute of 1943.46 Immediately
following this, Chicago passed an amortization scheme in its zoning ordi-
nances.47 This reversed the prior trend to protect non-conforming uses
36. 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 457, 274 P.2d 34, 44 (1954).
37. Note, 53 MICH. L. Rpv. 762 (1955) ; Note, 8 OKLA. L. Rgv. 239 (1955)
Note, 2 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 295 (1955). Further analysis of the California treatment
may be found in Riffle, The Elimination of the Non-conforming Use in California,
8 HASTINGs L.J. 64 (1957).
38. 43 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 1950).
39. 45 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 1950). Cf. Miami v. Ross, 76 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 1954).
40. 183 F.2d 410 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 892 (1950).
41. 4 N.Y.2d 553, 152 N.E.2d 42 (1958).
42. 4 N.Y.2d 553, 563, 152 N.E.2d 42, 52 (1958).
43. Tgx. Riv. Civ. STAT., art. 101la-1011k (1953).
44. 152 Tex. 137, 254 S.W.2d 759 (1953).
45. 290 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
46. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 24, § 73-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1958). The gradual elim-
ination of non-conforming uses is provided for through amortization over terms
fixed by the municipal authorities.
47. CHICAGO, ILL., ZONING ORDINANCES § 20 (1944).
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in all instances from retroactive zoning.48 The court decisions still hold
that non-conforming uses are generally excepted from the operation of
zoning ordinances.
4 9
Massachusetts' statutes allow amortization to a limited extent in the
city of Boston,5 0 but prohibit amortization throughout the remainder of
the state. 51 In the case of Inspector of Buildings v. Murphy,5 2 this latter
prohibition was construed as the minimum expression of tolerance to be
accorded prior non-conforming uses.
Pennsylvania specifically permits counties to amortize non-conform-
ing uses.53 Municipalities in Pennsylvania are given a marked degree of
autonomy under home rule charters. Consequently, whether or not a
municipality in Pennsylvania can amortize a non-conforming use depends
upon its o'wn political propensities. The City of Philadelphia, for example,
has not seen fit to provide for removal of non-conforming uses, but it
has regulated them extensively. 5 4 There is only indirect evidence that
Pennsylvania approves the continuance of non-conforming uses as a matter
of municipal policy.5 5 The Pennsylvania courts have extended their mantle
of protection to non-conforming uses on the basis of retroactivity.5 6 The
conflict between this protection and the permitted amortization in counties
has not yet been resolved.
Virginia's statutes are unique. They prohibit county zoning boards
from abolishing non-conforming uses,5 7 but permit cities and towns to
adopt reasonable elimination methods. 58 Virginia's policy with respect to
county zoning is quite frequently adopted in the converse, since statutes
in other states authorizing county boards to amortize non-conforming
uses are plentiful. 59
48. Ill. Laws 1941, Vol. 2, p. 19 reads in part: "... [T]he powers conferred
by this article shall not be exercised so as to deprive the owner of any existing prop-
erty of its use or maintenance for the purpose to which it is .then lawfully devoted."
49. Schneider v. City of Ottawa, 402 Ill. 536, 84 N.E.2d 428 (1949) ; Chicago
v. Krema Trucking Co., 337 Il1. App. 662, 86 N.E.2d 431 (1949); Illinois Life
Ins. Co. v. Chicago, 244 Ill. App. 185 (1927.).
50. Mass. Acts 1948, c. 214, § 9.
51. MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 40, § 26 (1954). Compare In re Opinion of the Justices,
234 Mass. 597, 127 N.E. 525 (1920).
52. 320 Mass. 207, 68 N.E.2d 918 (1946).
53. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 2033 (1956).
54. PHILADELPHIA, PA., ORDINANCES, § 14-104, June 29, 1957.
55. In an act designed to prevent fraud on purchasers of realty, the Common-
wealth requires sellers of property in cities of the first class to produce a registra-
tion permit showing the legal use and zoning classification for such property. It
provides that a certificate of approval as a non-conforming use will satisfy the law.
PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 21, § 611-15 (Supp. 1958).
56. Molner v. Henne Co., 377 Pa. 571, 105 A.2d 325 (1954).
57. VA. CoDE ANN. § 15-848 (1950).
58. VA. CODE ANN. § 15-843 (1950).
59. E.g., CoLo. STAT. ANN. c. 45A. § 19 (Supp. 1953); KAN. STAT. GEN. ANN.
§ 19-2919 (Supp. 1957); LA. Rgv. STAT. § 33:4722 (1950); 0". REv. STAT.
§ 86.1210 (Supp. 1957); UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-24-18 (1952).
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3. Conservative States.
Kentucky,6 ° New Jersey,61 and Ohio62 have decreed that retroactive
application of zoning laws offends due process, and these holdings have
been ratified by their legislatures.6 3
Michigan, 64 Nebraska,6 5 South Carolina,66 and Wisconsin 67 have held
retroactive zoning laws unconstitutional in such broad terms as to preclude
the question of amortization at least for the time being.
Thus, it can readily be seen that neither the legislatures nor the
courts have been able to agree on the question of amortization. There is
clearly no uniformity,-what is more perturbing is the tendency of pro-
gressive states to become more progressive, and the corresponding tend-
ency of the conservative states to become more conservative, thus in-
creasing the distance between extreme points of view, and making com-
promise more difficult. The need for compromise is evident in all con-
tentious situations, and this situation more than most; for while rapid
urbanization compounds the problems of zoning, the stalemate thus far
created in respect to non-conforming uses is liable to produce a habit
of thinking which will delay rather than promote adoption of corrective
measures.
IV.
RECOMMENDATIONS.
Zoning laws themselves are not objectionable, it is the rationale be-
hid them which is feared. Democracy flourishes where freedom flourishes,
and economic freedom is the precursor of personal freedom.6 8 Therefore
conservative states abhor the unbridled exercise of zoning authority, no
matter how outwardly beneficent, because they see it as a restraint on
economic freedom. On the other hand, individual freedom must always
yield to the vital interests of the community at large, 69 if for no other
60. Darlington v. City of Frankfort, 282 Ky. 778, 140 S.W.2d 392 (1940).
61. Hay v. Board of Adjustment, 37 N.J. Super. 461, 117 A.2d 650 (1955).
62. City of Akron v. Chapman, 160 Ohio St. 382, 116 N.E.2d 697 (1953).
63. See Ky. Rtv. STAT. § 100.068 (1953) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-48 (1940)
OHIO Rev. CODE § 713.15 (Anderson Supp. 1957).
64. Bane v. Township of Pontiac, 343 Mich. 481, 72 N.W.2d 134 (1955).
65. Cassel Realty v. City of Omaha, 144 Neb. 753, 14 N.W.2d 600 (1944).
66. James v. City of Greenville, 227 S.C. 565, 88 S.E.2d 661 (1955).
67. State ex rel Schroedel v. Pagels, 257 Wis. 376, 43 N.W.2d 349 (1950).
68. ". . . [P]roperty as a condition of freedom is necessary to the normal satis-
faction of human nature. In its absence, general culture ultimately fails and so
certainly does citizenship. The cells of the body politic are atrophied and the mass
of men have not even, at last, an opinion of, their own, but are molded by the few
who retain ownership of land and endowments and reserves; so essential is prop-
erty to full life, though it is debatable as to whether a full life is to be aimed at.
There may be some who dislike freedom for themselves; there are certainly many
who dislike it for others. But, at any rate, freedom involves property." Belloc, On the
Restoration of Property, in THE WISDOM OF CATHOLICISM 840 (Pegis ed. 1949).
69. See CARLSTON, LAW AND STRUCTURES or SOCIAL ACTION (1957). The illus-
trations therein best exemplify the application of the principle.
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reason than the fact that man preserves his individual integrity through
a society. Therefore, progressive states regard retroactive zoning as a
valid exercise of the police power and as a valid restraint on personal
freedom.
The law of zoning has evolved from this dialectic of counter-forces,
progressivism and conservatism. Any recommendation for compromise
must be founded in methods which will decrease the risk of arbitrary dis-
regard of private interests and increase the probability of true community
benefit.
This Comment recommends changes in procedural safeguards,-
changes which are calculated to place the individual in a strong legal posi-
tion in order to obviate the judicial inclination to protect private rights
by interposing constitutional prohibitions. Additionally, these changes are
calculated to compel the zoning authority to think cautiously before it
tries to remove established uses of property, and to compel the zoning
authority to produce evidence and sound reasoning in the court room
as a condition to enforcement. Finally, these procedural changes will
counteract the administrative deficiencies which afflict the exercise of zon-
ing authority because of the extensive delegation of the zoning power.
These calculated effects will attract conservatives because a heavy burden
is put on the government, and the risk of nonchalant or preferential in-
fraction of private rights is reduced. At the same time, they do not alienate
the true progressive because proving the social need of zoning is the daily
task to which he is already dedicated.
The procedures by which zoning ordinances are enacted or amended
ought to be changed. Such procedures are not now calculated to ascertain
the existence of a legally recognized governmental concern, but are de-
signed to determine only whether or not there is majority approval of the
proposed ordinance or amendment in the zoning district.70 While ma-
jority rule is democratically valid for prospective laws, majority rule as
a basis for withdrawing present rights, fully vested, that is, as a basis
for retrospective laws, is a breach of the duty of government to act for
the common good of all, and ignores the fact that while men have equal
rights to the future, they have unequal standing in the present. Majority
rule in such cases can only be justified by adopting the expedient principle
that the duty of government is to act for the benefit of the majority who-
ever may compose it from time to time. There should be no procedural
70. Municipalities throughout the country have adopted substantially similar pro-
visions for enactment and amendment. The Ordinances of the City of Buffalo are
typical: (1) public notice and hearing are required prior to all enactments; (2)
amendments require the filing of a petition by at least 50% of the members in a
zoning district, a referral of the amendment to the city planning commission for an
advisory opinion, public hearing, and special notice to all interested parties (at least
every land owner in the district), approval by majority vote of city council, or, in
case there is more than 20% opposition in the district, approval by three-fourths vote
of the members of the council. See BUFFALO, N. Y., ZONING ORDINANCES, c. LXX,§ 22 (1958).
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duty upon a party injured by a retroactive law to persuade a percentage
of his neighbors to join his opposition to an autocratic majority. The fact
that the law is being retroactively applied is cause enough for city councils
to entertain individual petitions. Such safeguards insure restraint in the
exercise of legislative power and thereby enhance judicial respect for
zoning ordinances.
It is suggested further that the traditional presumption of validity
accorded legislative enactments ought to be reversed where a zoning ordi-
nance removes a non-conforming use. There is a very real danger in
retroactive application of zoning laws that the procedural formality of bur-
dens of proof will be the sole cause of the loss of substantive rights.71
Because an injured party cannot muster the evidence to prove that the
general welfare recitals in a zoning ordinance are not the basis for the
law, the judge must hold that the law is valid and does represent an enact-
ment to benefit the community.7 2 Natural reluctance to accept rules in
lieu of evidence, and a mature familiarity with the weakness of city coun-
cils and the strength of political pressure groups encourages judicial opinion
to interpret the constitutions strictly as a means for preventing injustice.73
The burden of proving the validity of the ordinance has been shifted
to the municipality where its zoning laws have summarily excluded
churches and schools, uses of property in their very nature designed to
benefit the community.74 The same reasoning can be applied to non-
conforming uses and retroactive application of zoning ordinances; the very
fact that uses of land have been tolerated for a considerable period before
the enactment of the ordinance should raise such a presumption of their
legality and their benefit to the community that the municipality should
be required to prove-not merely to recite-the opposite thereof.
V.
CONCLUSION.
It is really unnecessary to invoke the constitution in regulating the
non-conforming use. It is possible that procedural safeguards could per-
mit the rule of law to be settled in favor of amortization and retroactivity
71. "Since there is a presumption of validity in favor of a zoning ordinance,
adopted pursuant to a legislative grant, the one assailing its validity has the burden
of proof that the ordinance is invalid, or unreasonable, or confiscatory, as to his
property." Khrom v. City of Elmhurst, 8 Ill. 2d 104, 105, 133 N.E.2d 1, 2 (1956).
Such is the general rule. Vernon Park Realty Co. v. City of Mt. Vernon, 307 N.Y.
493, 121 N.E.2d 517 (1954) ; Shepherd v. City of Skaneateles, 300 N.Y. 115, 89
N.E.2d 619 (1949); Wicker Apts. Inc. v. Richmond, 199 Va. 263, 99 S.E.2d 656
(1957).
72. Wicker Apts. Inc. v. Richmond, supra note 71.
73. Town of Somers v. Camarco, 308 N.Y. 537, 127 N.E.2d 327 (1955) ; Con-
cordia Collegiate Institute v. Miller, 301 N.Y. 189, 93 N.E.2d 632 (1950); Averne
Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938).
74. Roman Catholic Welfare Corp v. City of Piedmont, 45 Cal. 2d 325, 289 P.2d
438 (1955); Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., 1 N.Y.2d 508, 136 N.E.2d 827
(1956).
[VOL. 4
63
Editors: Comments
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1959
SPRING 1959]
at a minimum risk of abuse and at a maximum guarantee of community
welfare.
The proponent of the amortization ordinance is the party acting in
derogation of the common law and of the status quo.75 He is the one who
would uproot a man's business or his home, perhaps destroy a lifetime of
labor; it is he who would produce the- economic hardship of relocation
and the personal hardship of readjustment. It should not be enough that
he is supported by a majority of the city council or town board. The
responsibility of the judiciary to defer to the legislative judgment is
hortatory, not obligatory. Deference is a matter of policy. In the case
of retroactive elimination of non-conforming uses, the benefit to be gained
by deference simply does not outweigh the risk involved unless the com-
munity interest is demonstrably present. Thus, the true issue is whether
or not amortization ordinances promote legitimate police power objectives.
Assertions or rules that conclude the issue are palpably frivolous; the
issue is at argument; let it be argued, let it be proved.
John M. Regan
75. "Such ordinances are in derogation of the common law right to so use private
property as to realize its highest utility, and while they should be liberally construed
to accomplish their plain intent and purpose, they should not be extended by im-
plication to cases not clearly within the scope and purpose manifest in their language."
Landay v. MacWilliams, 173 Md. 460, 464, 196 Atl. 293, 296 (1938).
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